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Abstract
With the growing amount of personal information exchanged over the Internet,
privacy is becoming more and more a concern for users. One of the key princi-
ples in protecting privacy is data minimisation. This principle requires that only
the minimum amount of information necessary to accomplish a certain goal is col-
lected and processed. “Privacy-enhancing” communication protocols have been
proposed to guarantee data minimisation in a wide range of applications. How-
ever, currently there is no satisfactory way to assess and compare the privacy they
offer in a precise way: existing analyses are either too informal and high-level, or
specific for one particular system. In this work, we propose a general formal frame-
work to analyse and compare communication protocols with respect to privacy by
data minimisation. Privacy requirements are formalised independent of a particular
protocol in terms of the knowledge of (coalitions of) actors in a three-layer model
of personal information. These requirements are then verified automatically for
particular protocols by computing this knowledge from a description of their com-
munication. We validate our framework in an identity management (IdM) case
study. As IdM systems are used more and more to satisfy the increasing need for
reliable on-line identification and authentication, privacy is becoming an increas-
ingly critical issue. We use our framework to analyse and compare four identity
management systems. Finally, we discuss the completeness and (re)usability of
the proposed framework.
1 Introduction
As more and more personal information is exchanged over the Internet by businesses
and other organisations, privacy risks are becoming a major concern. For instance,
e-health and identity management systems deal with large amounts of personal infor-
mation. There have been numerous reports of information from such systems being
used for secondary purposes [94], or being stolen and abused by third parties [80].
Legislation (e.g., EU Directive 95/46/EC, HIPAA) attempts to reduce these risks by re-
quiring such systems to satisfy the data minimisation principle. That is, systems have
to be designed to ensure that actors in such systems collect and store only the mini-
mal amount of personal information needed to fulfil their task. This means limiting
the amount of shared personal information, but also limiting the use of identifiers that
different actors can use to correlate their views on a data subject [53].
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One important approach to achieve privacy by data minimisation is the use of
privacy-enhancing communication protocols [53, 93]. Such protocols use crypto-
graphic primitives to ensure that participants learn as little information as possible,
and that they have as little ability as possible to correlate information from different
sources. Privacy-enhancing protocols have been proposed for a wide range of applica-
tions: e.g., smart metering [82], e-voting [50], and electronic toll collection [42].
Understanding the privacy differences between privacy-enhancing protocols de-
signed for the same purpose is important, e.g., for system designers who want to use
privacy-enhancing protocols, or for system administrators who want to select what sys-
tem to use. However, it is typically not straightforward to obtain such an understanding.
One reason is that privacy-enhancing protocols typically combine (advanced) crypto-
graphic primitives in subtle ways; also, typical scenarios involve multiple actors which
may collude in different coalitions to correlate their views on data subjects. Exist-
ing comparisons in areas such as e-health [74, 92] or identity management [1, 55] are
performed in an informal and high-level (and thus, possibly subjective) way, and thus
their privacy assessments do not offer much insight into differences between systems
and the reasons behind them. On the other hand, proposals for privacy-enhancing sys-
tems typically assess the privacy of their own solution using terminology and criteria
specific to the setting at hand, making it hard to compare different systems. Thus,
we need a practical way to compare different systems that is precise and verifiable,
yet application-independent; and that provides sufficient detail for real insight into the
privacy differences that exist between systems.
Formal methods provide the machinery to perform such a comparison. Over the
years, formal methods, e.g., the applied pi calculus [2], have arisen as an important
tool to analyse security of communication in IT systems [2, 22, 68, 78]. The idea is
to express communication protocols in a suitable formalism, and then verify whether
such a model of the protocol satisfies, e.g., authentication properties [22] or secrecy
properties [10]. Secrecy, in particular, expresses one aspect of privacy; namely, whether
a certain piece of information is known by some party in a protocol. However, it leaves
unanswered a question which is equally important for privacy-enhancing protocols;
namely, whether a certain piece of information can be linked to its corresponding data
subject (who, in general, might not be a direct participant in the communication under
analysis).
Recently, several research efforts have focused on the analysis of privacy proper-
ties using the applied pi calculus and related techniques [21, 42, 43, 45, 91], in ap-
plication domains such as electronic toll collection [42], e-voting [43, 45], and RFID
systems [21]. While this approach has delivered considerable successes, several issues
inhibit its use for our purposes, namely, practical and accessible high-level privacy
analysis. First, in many cases, properties are defined and verified specific to their re-
spective settings or protocols [42, 43, 45]. General definitions for the common privacy
property of linkability exist [5], but they are aimed towards linking messages to their
senders (whereas data minimisation concerns linking of information to its data subject)
and defined with respect to an outside attacker (whereas data minimisation concerns
the knowledge of actors or coalitions inside the system). Second, such methods require
considerable manual work for each property to be verified, in many cases including
particular assumptions on the model to make computation feasible. Third, analysis
results are not summarised in a comprehensive and intuitive way, necessitating sub-
stantial manual review.
In our previous works [96, 99], we have introduced building blocks for high-level
privacy analysis of protocols to exchange personal information. We introduced a three-
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Figure 1: Steps of our privacy comparison framework
layer model that captures the knowledge of personal information held by different
(coalitions of) communicating parties [96, 99]. The model captures the context in
which pieces of information has been observed, as well as the contents they have. We
showed how relevant privacy requirements can be expressed as properties of items in
this model. We also showed how this model is determined from observations of com-
munication between the different parties. However, the model of [96, 99] only captures
communication that uses a limited set of cryptographic primitives; moreover, it does
not offer an implementation of the analysis method; and finally, it does not discuss in
general what kinds of privacy requirements can be verified, or how to perform a privacy
comparison in practice.
In this work, we combine our previous building blocks into a general framework
for privacy comparison of communication protocols, and we apply the framework in
an identity management case study. Specifically, our contributions are as follows:
• We present a framework to compare communication protocols with respect to
privacy by data minimisation. Our framework gives precise, verifiable results
with enough detail to obtain insight into privacy differences;
• We extend our previous formal method [96, 99] for the analysis of knowledge
of personal information to cover additional primitives and cryptographic proto-
cols (specifically, zero-knowledge proofs and issuing protocols for anonymous
credentials);
• We provide an implementation of the formal method in Prolog to automate part
of the comparison;
• We validate our framework by analysing and comparing four identity manage-
ment systems: we show that a range of relevant privacy requirements can be
captured by our model, and use our framework to formally analyse the identity
management systems with respect to these requirements.
Our privacy comparison framework consists of four steps, shown in Figure 1. The
first two steps are to model the scenario and its requirements. We introduce two for-
malisms: the Personal Information (PI) Model (§2.1) to model different types of per-
sonal information and their relations; and the view of an actor to describe the partial
knowledge about this information that this actor has at one point in time (§2.2). The
first step of our method comprises modelling all personal information using a PI model,
and modelling the initial knowledge of each actor as a view on that PI model. This
means modelling the personal information as used in the protocol instances in the sce-
nario; however, it also means modelling other knowledge of personal information held
initially by the actors. This way, we can assess how links can be established between
the knowledge learned from the protocol instances and the initial knowledge. The sec-
ond step is to model data minimisation requirements, i.e., which personal information
should become known or remain unknown to which actors in the system. These re-
quirements are phrased as properties of the views of actors after communication has
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taken place. These first two steps are performed independently from the particular
systems to be analysed.
The third step is then to model the exchange of information in the information sys-
tems. For this, we need to model the evolution of actor knowledge in such systems
due to the exchange of messages. We extend the PI model into an information model
that also includes messages using cryptographic primitives, and the non-personal in-
formation they may contain. We express the messages that an actor has exchanged at
a certain point in time using the notion of a knowledge base on that information model
(§3.1). We define a procedure to determine an actor’s view from his knowledge base
(§3.2), and present an algorithm that implements it (§3.3). Finally, we introduce states
to formalise the knowledge of all actors in the system at one point in time, and traces
to capture a series of communications that transforms one state into another (§4).
The fourth step is to verify which systems satisfy which requirements. This step
is performed automatically using our Prolog implementation1. Given a PI model, set
of formalised requirements, initial state and trace, this tool first determines the state of
the system after communication; then uses our formal procedure to compute the corre-
sponding views of the actors in the system, and finally determines which requirements
hold in these views.
We validate our framework by applying it to an identity management case study.
Identity management (IdM) systems [89, 58, 47] offer reliable on-line identification
and authentication to service providers by outsourcing these tasks to “identity providers”.
Identity providers endorse information about their users, and provide means for authen-
ticating a user in a service provision. To organisations, identity providers offer reduced
cost for obtaining reliable user information; to users, they offer increased convenience
by letting them reuse authentication credentials. The amount of personal information
exchanged in such systems makes privacy a critical issue; this is reflected by the large
number of privacy-enhancing IdM systems that have been proposed [8, 31, 100]. How-
ever, while high-level sketches of privacy issues [3, 12, 53, 61] and comparisons of
systems [1, 55] exist, no comprehensive set of relevant privacy requirements for IdM
systems has been proposed, nor do there exist precise formal comparisons. We demon-
strate that our framework can be used to perform such a comparison. In Section 5, we
present our case study: we introduce IdM, discuss privacy requirements for IdM sys-
tems, and introduce four IdM systems. In Section 6, we use our framework to formally
compare the privacy offered by these four IdM systems with respect to the requirements
introduced above, and discuss the results.
Finally, we discuss the completeness and (re)usability of our framework (§7). We
conclude the paper by discussing related work (§8), drawing conclusions, and pointing
to interesting directions for future work (§9).
2 A Model for Knowledge of Personal Information
In this section, we present the Personal Information (PI) Model and actor views. A PI
model (§2.1) describes personal information in an information system at a certain point
in time; the view of an actor involved in the system on this PI model (§2.2) captures the
knowledge about this information held by that actor. Privacy requirements (§2.3) are
modelled as properties of items from these views. The PI model is used in step 1 of our
framework (Figure 1) to model personal information, and it is the basis for the model
1The tool and formal model of our case study are available at www.mobiman.me/downloads/.
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of communication in step 3. Views are used in step 1 to express initial knowledge of
actors; in step 2 to model requirements; and in step 4 to compare actual knowledge to
these requirements. Our model is based on two main assumptions:
• Discrete information — There is a finite set of pieces of personal information
that each belong to a particular data subject. In particular, we allow knowledge
about finitely many boolean predicates on personal information (e.g., “Alice’s
age is below k” for some particular value k). Each piece of information has a
well-defined contents. (However, different pieces of information may have the
same contents.)
• Discrete knowledge — Actors may or may not be able to learn these pieces
of information; and they may or may not be able to learn that these pieces of
information are about the same data subject. In both cases, we do not allow
uncertainty: either an actor knows a piece of information or a link, or he does
not.
The above abstractions are common in the protocol verification literature [68], and
simplify both the specification of requirements and the modelling of protocols. We
discuss approaches that do not make these abstractions in Section 8.
2.1 Personal Information Model
A Personal Information (PI) model describes all personal information present in an
information system at a certain point in time.
2.1.1 Personal Information
A piece of personal information in the PI model is a specific string that has a specific
meaning as personal information about a specific person, e.g., “the age of Alice”. We
distinguish between two types of digital personal information: identifiers and data
items. Identifiers are unique within the system; for data items, this is not necessarily
the case. The sets of identifiers and data items are denoted I and D, respectively.
We express that pieces of personal information satisfy certain fixed boolean properties
relevant to the application domain by a set {ψ1, . . . ,ψk} of partial functions I ∪D→D
that assign properties to some of the identifiers and data items. For instance, suppose
ψ j represents the property that an age is over 60. If ψ j(d) is defined, i.e., d has an
image under partial function ψ j, then d represents the age of a data subject who is over
60 and ψ j(d) represents the fact that this data subject has an age over 60. If ψ j(d) is
not defined, i.e., d does not have an image under partial function ψ j, then either d does
not represent an age, or it represents an age below 60. The set E of entities models
the real-world persons whom the considered information is about. Elements of the setO ∶= E ∪I∪D are called items of interest. The link between information and its subject
is captured by the related relation, an equivalence relation on O denoted⇔. Namely,
given two items of interest o1,o2 ∈O, o1 ⇔ o2 means that o1 and o2 are information
about the same person.
These concepts, however, are insufficient to model all privacy aspects of communi-
cation protocols that we are interested in. First, it is relevant to know whether different
pieces of information have the same contents or not. For instance, Alice’s age may
be the same as Bob’s, and Alice’s age may be the same as Alice’s apartment number.
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Whether this is the case influences what information can be determined from crypto-
graphic primitives: for instance, an actor can determine a piece of information from
its cryptographic hash if he knows another piece of information with the same con-
tents. Second, it is relevant to know how an actor obtained a piece of information. We
assumed that actors combine pieces of information that they know belong to the same
data subject. However, if an actor learns the same piece of information (e.g., “the age of
Alice”) several times (e.g., in two protocol instances with different session identifiers),
he may not know that it is the same information. Thus, to represent the knowledge of
this actor, we need to distinguish between these two “representations” of the informa-
tion.
2.1.2 Three-Layer Model
Because of the need to distinguish different instances of the same piece of information,
as well as to reason about message contents, we introduce a three-layer representation
of personal information. The representation consists of the context layer, information
layer, and contents layer. At the information layer, as described above, the information
itself is represented, e.g., “Alice’s city”. At the context layer, information is described
in terms of the context in which it has been observed, e.g., “the city of the user in proto-
col instance #1”. At the contents layer, information is described in terms of the strings
actually transmitted in a protocol, e.g., “Eindhoven”. Actor knowledge is modelled
using the context layer and reasoned about using the contents layer; the information
layer is used to specify privacy requirements or visualise analysis results [97].
At the context layer, we model the context in which an actor knows pieces of in-
formation. A context is an item ∗∣ηk , where η is called the domain, and k is called
the profile. A domain is any separate digital “place” where personal information is
stored or transmitted, e.g., a database or an instance of a communication protocol. A
profile represents a particular data subject in a domain, e.g., an entry about one person
in a database, or a logical role in a protocol instance (however, different profiles in a
domain may still represent the same data subject, e.g., duplicate entries in a database).
In such a context, pieces of information are represented by variables. A variable
describes the type of information in the context of that domain, e.g. “session identifier”
or “age attribute”. Namely, the piece of information with variable v in context ∗∣ηk
is denoted v∣ηk . Context-layer representations of entities, identifiers, and data items
are modelled by context entities Ec, context identities Ic, and context data items Dc,
respectively. The set Oc ∶= Ec ∪ Ic ∪Dc is the set of all context personal items. The
unique context entity in context ∗∣ηk is denoted ds∣ηk . Properties of identifiers and data
items are modelled at the context layer by extending the partial functions ψi above.
We represent personal information at the contents layer as elements from an arbi-
trary set C of message contents. In fact, for our purposes the exact representation is not
relevant; it suffices to know which pieces of information have the same contents, and
which do not.
Apart from these three descriptions of pieces of personal information, the PI model
also defines mappings between the three layers. Namely, it defines a mapping σ from
the context layer to the information layer; and a mapping τ from the information layer
to the contents layer. Properties of σ and τ reflect characteristics of the different pieces
of information, as shown below.
Formally, a PI model is defined as follows:
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Definition 1. A Personal Information (PI) Model is a tuple
(Oc,O,⇔,σ ,τ,{ψ1, . . . ,ψk})
so that:
• Oc is a set of context personal items, partitioned into Oc = Ec ∪ Ic ∪Dc. Here,
Ec are context entities ds∣κn with arbitrary domain κ and profile n; Ic and Dc are
context identifiers and context data items v∣κn with arbitrary variable v, domain κ
and profile n, respectively;
• O is a set of items of interest, partitioned intoO = E ∪I∪D. Here, E are entities;I are identifiers; and D are data items;
• ⇔⊂O×O is the related relation onO: an equivalence relation so that every item
of interest is related to exactly one entity;
• σ is a map Oc→O so that σ(Ec) ⊂ E ; σ(Ic) ⊂ I; and σ(Dc) ⊂D; and σ(x∣ηk )⇔
σ(y∣ηk ) for any x∣ηk , y∣ηk ;
• τ is a map I ∪D→ C so that ∀i1, i2 ∈ I: if τ(i1) = τ(i2), then i1 = i2;
• {ψ1, . . . ,ψn} are partial functions ψi ∶ Ic∪Dc →Dc, I ∪D→D so that: 1) ψi(o)
is related to o ∈ I ∪D whenever defined; 2) τ(ψi(o1)) = τ(ψi(o2)) whenever
defined for some o1,o2 ∈ I ∪D; 3) ψi(o) has the same context as o ∈ Ic ∪Dc
whenever defined; 4) σ(ψi(o)) =ψi(σ(o)) for every o ∈ Ic∪Dc for which ψi(o)
is defined.
The first two bullets of the definition define information at the context and informa-
tion layers, respectively; the third bullet defines personal relations at the information
layer. The fourth and fifth bullet define the mapping between the three layers: we de-
mand that the contents of identifiers are unique. The sixth bullet introduces properties
both at the context and information layers. Properties at the information layer pre-
serve relation ⇔ (1) and have contents independent from the item they are a property
of (2); properties at the context layer preserve context (3) and are consistent with the
information-layer properties (4).
We introduce notation for context personal items x∣ηk , y∣χl representing the same
information or contents. If σ(x∣ηk ) = σ(y∣χl ), then we write x∣ηk ≡ y∣χl and we call x∣ηk
and y∣χl equivalent. If τ(σ(x∣ηk )) = τ(σ(y∣χl )), then we write x∣ηk ≐ y∣χl and we call them
content equivalent. Clearly, equivalence implies content equivalence.
The next example shows a PI model as used in step 1 of our analysis framework,
i.e., to model all personal information present in a particular scenario.
Example 2. Figure 2 shows a PI model representing personal information about two
entities, Alice (al ∈ E) and Bob (bob ∈ E), in a simple scenario. Recall that a PI model is
used to express all personal information in a scenario, regardless of which protocols are
used; regardless of who knows the information, and also including other information
that it may be linked to by the actors involved. In this scenario, a client and a server
exchange information about Alice. Namely, the server has a database with personal
information about different entities; the server and client engage in a protocol to ex-
change information about Alice; and the client combines the results with her address
book.
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Figure 2: Personal Information Model of Example 2
At the information layer of this PI model, Alice has identifier ida and an age agea;
Bob has identifier idb, age ageb, and telephone number telnb. Alice and Bob happen to
have the same age, so τ(agea) = τ(ageb); the other pieces of information have distinct
contents. (This example does not consider attribute properties.)
At the context layer of this PI model, the personal information in this scenario is
modelled as follows:
• domain db (database held by the server): Each profile k ∈ {1,2} in this domain
represents a database entry consisting of database key key∣dbk and column value
col1∣dbk . As shown in the figure, the keys and column values map to the data
subjects’ identifiers and ages, respectively. The data subject of profile k is repre-
sented by context entity ds∣dbk .
• domain ab (address book of the client): Each profile k ∈ {4,12} in this domain
represents an entry in the address book. The fourth entry of the address book
contains an identifier id∣ab4 ; the 12th entry contains a telephone number teln∣ab12.
• domain pi (protocol instance): The client and server engage in an instance pi of
a protocol in which identifier id∣pisu and attribute attr∣pisu are exchanged about data
subject su; in this case, the subject is Alice and the attribute is her age.
(In a full analysis using our framework, we would also model the client and server
as entities. This allows us to reason about knowledge about their involvement in this
scenario. For simplicity, we omit them here.)
2.2 Views: Actor Knowledge
Each actor in an information system has partial knowledge about the personal informa-
tion in that system. Our framework analyses privacy by data minimisation by verifying
that this partial knowledge satisfies certain requirements. We model actors as a finite
setA. We require each actor to be an entity in the PI model, i.e.,A ⊂ E . The knowledge
of an actor at some point in time consists of knowledge of some pieces of personal in-
formation, and knowledge that some of these pieces of information are about the same
person. We capture this knowledge as a view on the PI model, consisting of a set of
context-layer items and an equivalence relation on them:
Definition 3. Let M = (Oc,O,⇔,σ ,τ,{ψ1, . . . ,ψk}) be a PI Model. A view on M is a
tuple V = (O∗,↔∗) such that:
• O∗ ⊂Oc is the set of detectable items;
• ↔∗⊂O∗×O∗ is the associability relation: an equivalence relation on O∗.
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Figure 3: Views of actors c and s and coalition {c,s} in a scenario (Example 4).
Detectable context personal items are shown; grey areas are sets of equivalent items.
Associations are represented by arrows; for simplicity, they are shown up to equiva-
lence.
The view of actor a ∈A, determined in step 4 of our framework, is denoted Va =(Oa,↔a). From a privacy perspective, we are not just interested in the views of single
actors a ∈A, but also in the views of coalitions A ⊂A. Such a view represents knowl-
edge of personal information when the actors in the coalition combine all information
(e.g., databases, communication transcripts) they have. The view of coalition A ⊂A
after communication is denoted VA = (OA,↔A). It contains at least the knowledge of
each individual actor in the coalition.
We next show an example of the views of actors and coalitions, as they may be
obtained in step four of our framework when analysing a particular communication
protocol.
Example 4. Consider the PI model M from Example 2. The actors in this information
system are the client and server, i.e.,A = {c,s}. Figure 3 shows example views of these
actors after some particular communication protocol has been executed (domain pi).
First consider the view Vc = (Oc,↔c) on M modelling personal information known
by the client. This information comprises the entries from her telephone book and the
information about Alice that has been communicated. Namely, the client knows Bob’s
telephone number telnbob as entry teln∣ab12 ∈Oc in her telephone book; she also knows
that this is Bob’s telephone number, expressed by detectability ds∣ab12 ∈Oc and associa-
bility ds∣ab12↔c teln∣ab12. About Alice, the client knows two context-layer representations
of identifier ida: as part of her telephone book entry (id∣ab4 ∈ Oc), and as a piece of
information sent in protocol instance pi (id∣pisu ∈Oc). She again knows the data subject
corresponding to the telephone book entry (ds∣ab4 ), and she knows the age transmitted in
the protocol (attr∣pisu ∈Oc). Moreover, she can associate the information in the address
book to the information from the protocol instance.
The view Vs = (Os,↔s) of the server also contains information about both Alice
and Bob. About Bob, the server knows two mutually associable pieces of informa-
tion col1∣db2 , key∣db2 from the database. About Alice, the server also knows two asso-
ciable pieces of information from the database. In addition, it knows the two other
context-layer representations id∣pisu, attr∣pisu of that same information as transmitted in
the protocol instance pi .
Now consider the view V{c,s} of the client and server if they combine their knowl-
edge. In this view, all information about Alice from the two actors is mutually asso-
ciable because both actors know the same identifier (in the figure, all context personal
items about Alice are connected by arrows). However, information about Bob is di-
vided into two equivalence classes: the client knows entity bob and his telephone num-
ber telnbob and the server knows age ageb and telephone number telnb, but they cannot
associate this information to each other (indicated by the absence of arrows between
the information in the figure).
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2.3 Privacy Requirements
The second step of our analysis framework is to model each relevant data minimisation
requirement in terms of the views of actors and coalitions. This includes both mod-
elling functional requirements, i.e., modelling what should be learned by the actors in
the protocol, and modelling privacy requirements, i.e., modelling what should not be
learned. These requirements are formulated independently from any particular system,
then verified for each particular system modelled. Thus, our framework can be used to
generically verify any requirement that can be phrased in terms of views, including:
• Detectability requirements — Can a given actor/coalition of actors detect a given
piece of information, or a given context-layer representation?
• Linkability requirements — Can a given actor/coalition of actors associate given
contexts, or any contexts in which he knows given pieces of information?
• Involvement requirements — Is there a domain d in which an actor can associate
one profile to a given context c1, and another to a given context c2, i.e., does he
know that the actors represented by c1,c2 were both involved in domain d?
More complex requirements can be defined as arbitrary combinations of these ele-
mentary requirements and their negations. The next example shows different types of
requirements.
Example 5. We formulate three requirements for the scenario given in Example 2.
Recall that we have actors A = {c,s} with views
Vc = (Oc,↔c),Vs = (Os,↔s), and V{c,s} = (O{c,s},↔{c,s}).
First, since the goal of the protocol is to exchange information, we can check whether
the client has indeed learned the age of Alice, and whether she can link it to her tele-
phone book entry. This corresponds to verifying that attr∣pisu ∈ Oc and attr∣pisu ↔c id∣ab4
hold (a detectability requirement and a linkability requirement, respectively). Second,
since the protocol does not concern Bob, we may want to make sure that the client and
server together cannot inadvertently link Bob’s telephone number and age due to this
protocol instance. This corresponds to verifying that teln∣ab12↔c,s col1∣db2 does not hold
(an unlinkability requirement).
Now consider the views in the particular system from Example 4. In this case, both
properties hold. Namely, in view Vc, attr∣pisu ∈Vc and age∣pisu↔c id∣ab4 are true (Figure 3,
left), while in view V{c,s}, teln∣ab12↔c,s col1∣db2 is not true (Figure 3, right).
We show additional examples of the different types requirements in Section 6 when
analysing identity management systems. In Section 7, we discuss what kind of require-
ments cannot be represented in this way.
3 Deducing Views from Communicated Messages
In this section, we determine the views of actors by modelling and analysing the mes-
sages they have exchanged. We present the information model, capturing messages
containing personal information; and knowledge bases, capturing which messages an
actor has observed at a certain point in time. We then propose a formal procedure to de-
rive an actor’s view from his knowledge base. This procedure is based on the following
main assumptions:
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• Detecting from messages — We model messages using a Dolev-Yao-style black-
box model of cryptography. A piece of personal information is detected using a
message it occurs in by: 1) reading it from that message; 2) applying a crypto-
graphic operation on the message that uses the information; or 3) comparing the
message’s contents to another message whose structure is known.
• Associating by identifiers — Contexts are associated to each other by observing
that the same identifier or entity occurs in both contexts.
The modelling of cryptographic primitives and operations as “terms” in a black-box
model is standard ever since the seminal work by Dolev and Yao [44]. Determining
what knowledge can be read from such messages can be done using standard deduc-
tive systems [37, 44, 49]. When adapting these standard techniques to our model of
personal information, observing the application of cryptographic operations and com-
paring the contents of messages are needed as extensions. These three ways of deriving
personal information also occur in the popular equational approach using static equiv-
alences [16]; see Section 8 for a comparison.
Defining associability by identifiers is suitable for our goal, namely, comparing
different protocols with respect to the knowledge that actors learn. Namely, protocols
differ in what identifiers they use and how; our definition of associability allows us
to reason about the privacy consequences this has. Associability does not take into
account probabilistic links due to (combinations of) non-identifying personal informa-
tion; probabilistic linking methods are orthogonal to our approach (see Section 8).
The formalisation of messages and knowledge bases is described in Section 3.1; the
methodology for determining views from knowledges base is described in Section 3.2.
3.1 Messages, Information Model, Knowledge Base
Communication in privacy-enhancing protocols uses messages built up from personal
and other information, e.g., nonces and session keys. At the context layer of our three-
layer model, non-personal information is modelled by a set Gc of context non-personal
items. Items in Gc belong to a domain, but not to a profile: in this case we denote the
profile as ⋅, e.g. shakey∣η⋅ . At the information layer, we define set G of non-personal
items.
Messages built from personal and non-personal information using cryptographic
primitives such as encryption, signatures, and hashes, are defined using a grammar.
Figure 1 shows the grammar for the primitives used to model the identity management
architectures presented in Section 5. For instance, S∗(∗) represents digital signatures:
if k−∣pis ∈ Ic is a private key and d∣pisu ∈Dc is a data item, then Sk−∣pis (d∣pisu) is a digital signa-
ture on the data item using the key. (In this case, we write Sk−∣s(d∣su)∣pi as shorthand.)
Although we model particular primitives here, our approach in general is independent
from the particular primitives that are used; in Section 7, we offer some insight into the
effort needed to model other primitives. As usual (e.g., [17]), the public key belonging
to private key k− is represented as pk(k−).
We model the following cryptographic primitives. Concatenation, hashing, and
(a)symmetric encryption are modelled as usual [37, 49]. Digital signatures are “with
appendix” [69]: that is, an actor needs to know the message that was signed in order
to verify the signature. Labelled asymmetric encryption [8] is asymmetric encryption
to which a label is unmodifiably attached at encryption time. For instance, the label
can represent a policy specifying when the recipient is allowed to decrypt the data.
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Messages Meaning
M,Mi ∶∶=∅ ∣ empty message
p ∣ information (for Lc: p ∈ Ic∪Dc∪Gc; for L: p ∈ I ∪D∪G)
pk(M1) ∣ public key corresponding to private key M1{M1, . . . ,Mn} ∣ concatenation of messages M1, . . . ,MnH(M1) ∣ hash of message M
E′M1(M2) ∣ symmetric encryption of message M2 with key M1
EM1(M2) ∣ asymmetric encryption of message M2 with public key M1
SM1(M2) ∣ digital signature of message M2 with private key M1
EM1(M2)M3 ∣ labelled asymmetric encryption of message M2 with public key
M1 and label M3
AKA(M1;M2;M3;M4) ∣ derived key from authenticated key agreement (AKA) with
(SK,randomness) pairs (M1,M2) and (M3,M4)
credM1M2(M3;M4) ∣ anonymous credential with user identifier M1, issuer private
key M2, attributes M3, and randomness M4
ZK(M1;M2;M3;M4) ∣ zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of secret M1 with proper-
ties M3 using public information M2 and randomness M4
ICredM1M2(M3;M4) issuing protocol for anonymous credential credM1M2(M3;M′4),
where M′4 is derived from M4
Table 1: Grammar defining sets of cryptographic messages at context layer (Lc) and
information layer
Authenticated key agreement (AKA) [63] allows two parties to derive a unique session
key based on secret keys and randomness contributed by both parties. We consider the
variant presented in [63] in which both parties send each other a random value. Both
parties can determine the session key, modelled by the AKA primitive, from one private
key, the other public key, and the randomness. The cred primitive models anonymous
credentials [8]. Message credM1M2(M3;M4) represents an endorsement with private key
M2 that the attributes M3 belong to the user with identifier M1, randomised using M4.
We also model two-party cryptographic protocols. Using these protocols, anony-
mous credentials can be issued without the issuer obtaining the credential or learning
M1; also, their ownership can be proven without revealing the credential itself. Such
protocols only have meaning when looked at as a whole, i.e., the meaning lies not in
individual messages, but in their combination in a particular order. Thus, we model
the complete transcript (i.e., all messages of all participants) of such a protocol as one
grammar element. We introduce two such primitives.
First, we model a family of zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs (e.g., [41]) by means of
the ZK primitive. In a ZK proof for a given property, a prover wants to convince a
verifier that he knows some secrets satisfying that property with respect to some given
public information, without revealing anything about the secrets. Here, we consider
ZK proofs proving that (1) the public information has a certain message structure with
respect to the private information, and (2) some secret attributes di satisfy some prop-
erties ψk(di). For instance, ZK({d,n};H({d,n});ψ2(d);n′) denotes a ZK proof (us-
ing randomness n′) convincing a verifier knowing the hash H({d,n}) that the prover
knows the pre-image {d,n} of the hash, and that ψ2(d) is satisfied; without the verifier
learning anything else about d or n. See Appendix B.1 for a detailed discussion.
Second, we model the issuing protocol for anonymous credentials [8] by means of
the ICred primitive. This protocol is run between a user and an issuer. In advance,
both parties need to know the attributes to be certified, but only the user needs to know
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the identifier to which the attributes are issued. As a result of the protocol, the user
obtains an anonymous credential linking the attributes to the identifier. The issuer does
not learn the credential; moreover, because he does not know the identifier, he cannot
issue credentials in her name without her involvement. Also, by using ZK proofs for
proving ownership, the credential can be “shown” without revealing the identifier. See
Appendix B.2 for details.
Formally, we define an information model that extends the personal information
model from Definition 1 by adding non-personal information and messages:
Definition 6. An information model is a tuple
(Lc,L,Ec,E ,⇔,σ ,τ,{ψ1, . . . ,ψk})
so that:
• The set Lc of context messages consists of sets Ic of context identifiers, Dc of
context data items, and Gc of context non-personal items, and messages built
from them using the grammar of Table 1. Here, Ic and Dc are as in Definition 1;
Gc consists of items p∣η⋅ with arbitrary variable p and domain η ; the set Pc ∶=
Ic∪Dc∪Gc is the set of context items;
• The set L of information messages consists of sets I of identifiers and D of data
items as in Definition 1; G of non-personal items; and messages built from them
using the grammar of Table 1;
• Sets Ec of context entities and E of entities, and the related relation ⇔ on O =E ∪I ∪D are as in Definition 1.
• σ is a map Lc ∪Ec → L∪E ; as a map σ ∣Oc ∶ Oc → O, σ is as in Definition 1
(where Oc = Ec ∪ Ic ∪Dc, and O = E ∪I ∪D); also, σ(Gc) ⊂ G, and σ preserves
the grammar structure of messages;
• τ is a map L→ C; τ ∣I∪D is as in Definition 1; τ(E′x(y)) = τ(z) iff z = E′x′(y′),
τ(x) = τ(x′) and τ(y) = τ(y′); and similarly for other primitives.
• {ψ1, . . . ,ψk} are partial functions ψi ∶ Ic∪Dc→Dc, I ∪D→D as in Definition 1.
In particular, (Oc,O,⇔,σ ,τ,{ψ1, . . . ,ψk}) in the above definition is a PI model.
Note that (context) entities cannot occur in messages, so we mention them explicitly in
the tuple defining an information model. The maps σ and τ preserve grammar struc-
ture; for instance, if σ(k−) = skal and σ(d) = agebob, then σ(Sk−(d)) = Sskal(agebob).
Like pieces of personal information, we call context messages m and n in general
equivalent iff σ(m) = σ(n), and content equivalent iff τ(σ(m)) = τ(σ(n)).
The above restrictions on the way τ acts on encryptions and other primitives (the
fifth bullet of the definition) reflect two assumptions on message contents: namely, that
they are deterministic and unique. The “if” part of the statement reflects determinism,
meaning that given the same contents as input, cryptographic primitives always give
the same output. Randomness, e.g., in signing or in non-deterministic encryption, can
be modelled explicitly as part of the plaintext. By assuming deterministic messages, we
can distinguish the case where an actor observes two different randomised encryptions
with the same input from the case where he observes the same randomised encryption
twice; in the latter case, we will allow an actor to draw certain conclusions from this.
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The “only if” part reflects uniqueness. Concerning uniqueness, note that differently-
constructed messages could a priori have the same contents; e.g., the hashes of two
different values could collide; or the hash of some value could be the same as the
encryption of some other value. We assume that this does not happen, i.e., elements of
our grammar at the contents layer uniquely represent message contents (the structural
equivalence assumption [99]).
The complete knowledge of an actor is modelled by a knowledge base. We model
this knowledge at the context layer so that we can later determine what knowledge of
personal information follows from it. Formally:
Definition 7. Let I = (Lc,L,Ec,E ,⇔,σ ,τ,{ψ1, . . . ,ψk}) be an information model. A
knowledge base on I is a set C ⊂Lc∪Ec.
In addition to the messages an actor has sent and received, his knowledge base
needs to contain the pieces of personal information from his initial view. This includes
context entities: because they cannot occur in messages, we mention them explicitly in
the definition. Also, the knowledge base should contain other relevant material such as
secret keys known by the actor, and nonces he has generated during the execution of
the cryptographic protocols. Note that we do not need to specify the order of messages:
because we use contexts, we can already distinguish between messages from different
protocol instances. We use the notation Ca to refer to the knowledge base of an actor a,
and CA to refer to the knowledge base of coalition A ⊂A (defined to be the union of the
knowledge bases of the respective actors, see Section 4).
In the next example, we show several context messages and the knowledge base of
an actor after communication.
Example 8. We consider the PI model of Example 2. We model two context mes-
sages in domain pi , which represents a protocol instance. First, we model a symmetric
encryption of Alice’s identifier, encrypted using a shared key. The shared key is mod-
elled by a non-personal item with context-layer representation shkey∣pi⋅ . The encryption
is then denoted
m1 = E′shkey∣⋅(id∣su)∣pi .
Second, we model a message representing an encryption under shkey∣pi⋅ of Alice’s age
and a randomised signature on her age using the server’s secret key. The randomness
used in the signature is represented as a non-personal item with context-layer represen-
tation n∣pi⋅ . The secret key of the server is context identifier k−∣pisrv. The second message
is:
m2 = E′shkey∣⋅({age∣su,n∣⋅,Sk−∣srv({age∣su,n∣⋅})})∣pi .
We now consider the knowledge base of the client, supposing that he has observed
(i.e., sent or received) messages m1 and m2. We model the communication addresses
that the client and the server have used as context identifiers ip∣picl , ip∣pisrv. The client
knows these, as well as messages m1,m2. In addition, his knowledge base contains the
personal and other information known at the beginning of the scenario. Apart from his
address book, we assume that this initial knowledge includes the shared key, as well as
his own address and the address and public key of the server, known in some arbitrary
contexts ∗∣⋅⋅, ∗∣⋅me, ∗∣⋅srv. His full knowledge base after communication is then:Ccli = {ds∣ab12,teln∣ab12,ds∣ab4 , id∣ab4 ,skey∣⋅⋅, ip∣⋅me, ip∣⋅srv,
pk(k−∣⋅srv), ip∣picl , ip∣pisrv,m1,m2},
with ds∣ab12,ds∣ab4 context entities and the other elements of Ccli context messages.
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3.2 From Knowledge Base to View
In this subsection, we show how to determine the view corresponding to a knowledge
base. The first component of the view, the set of detectable items, is defined using a
deductive system. The second component, the associability relation, is defined based
on linking identifiers and entities.
3.2.1 A Deductive System for Detectability
In this section, we define what messages containing personal information can be built
from knowledge base C. Informally, we say that message m is detectable from C,
written C ⊢m, if it can be obtained from messages in C using the three operations on
messages described at the beginning of this section: reading information from them,
applying cryptographic operations on them, and comparing the contents of messages.
In particular, detectability of context identifiers and data items in a view is defined as
detectability from as messages from the corresponding knowledge base.
The semantics of ⊢ is given by a deductive system. Deductive systems are com-
monly used in protocol analysis to reason about what messages an attacker can fabri-
cate (see, e.g., [37, 49]). Typically, such deductive systems consist of general axioms
stating which messages are known; and particular construction and elimination rules
stating the functionality of cryptographic primitives: construction rules describe how
a cryptographic primitive is constructed from its parts (e.g., a symmetric encryption
is constructed from the key and plaintext); elimination rules describing how parts can
be obtained from a cryptographic primitive by applying cryptographic operations (e.g.
the plaintext is obtained from an encryption by decrypting using the key). However, in
these works, such rules operate directly on message contents, without taking into ac-
count what information they represent, or in which context this information is known
(i.e., they operate at our contents layer). Conversely, for our purposes, we need to con-
sider the context: hence we need to re-interpret these rules at the context layer and add
additional ones. Our formal definition of ⊢ is as follows:
Definition 9. Let C be a knowledge base, and m a context message. The detectability
relation C ⊢m is defined by the inference rules given in Figure 4.
The deductive system in Figure 4 consists of three general rules (⊢0), (⊢Eψ), and
(⊢C); and particular construction, elimination, and testing rules for the particular cryp-
tographic primitives modelled. Hence, when using our framework to analyse a system,
(⊢0), (⊢Eψ), and (⊢C) are always the same; the other rules need to be adapted to model
the particular primitives used in the system.
(⊢0) is the standard axiom to detect known messages. Construction and elimination
rules, in particular those for (standard) hashes, (a)symmetric encryption, concatenation,
and signatures, are as usual [37]. For instance, rule (⊢CE) states that symmetric en-
cryption E′n(m) can be detected if m and n can be detected, and rule (⊢EE) states that
plaintext m can be obtained from encryption E′n(m) if key n is known. However, note
that because our deductive system operates at the context layer, rule (⊢EE) only ap-
plies if the key is known in the same context as the message. Thus, this rule fails to
capture that an actor can perform decryption using keys he knows from different con-
texts. To avoid this problem, we introduce testing rules. These rules let an actor detect
a new context-layer representation of a messages whose contents he already knew by
applying a cryptographic operation. For instance, rule (⊢TE) states that if an actor can
detect encryption E′n(m) and any message content equivalent to n, then he can detect
n. He can then use n to decrypt the message.
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General
Rules (m ∈ C) (⊢0)C ⊢m C ⊢ d (ψi(d) defined) (⊢Eψ)C ⊢ψi(d)
C ⊢ n1 C ⊢m1 C ⊢m2 ((m1 ≐ m2)⇒ (m3 ≐ m4);
n1 =m3∼m4 n2) (⊢C)C ⊢ n2
PK
(⊢*P) C ⊢m (⊢CP)C ⊢ pk(m) Concate-nation (⊢*C) C ⊢m C ⊢ n (⊢CC)C ⊢ {m,n} C ⊢ {m,n} (⊢EC)C ⊢m C ⊢ {m,n} (⊢EC’)C ⊢ n Hash(⊢*H) C ⊢m (⊢CH)C ⊢H(m)
Symmetric en-
cryption (⊢*E) C ⊢m C ⊢ n (⊢CE)C ⊢ E′n(m)
C ⊢ E′n(m) C ⊢ n
(⊢EE)C ⊢m C ⊢ E
′
n(m) C ⊢ n′ (n′ ≐ n) (⊢TE)C ⊢ n
Asymmetric en-
cryption (⊢*A) C ⊢m C ⊢ k+ (⊢CA)C ⊢ Ek+(m)
C ⊢ Epk(k−)(m) C ⊢ k−
(⊢EA)C ⊢m
C ⊢ Epk(k−)(m) C ⊢ k−′ (k−′ ≐ k−) (⊢TA)C ⊢ k−
Sign
(⊢*S) C ⊢m C ⊢ k− (⊢CS)C ⊢ Sk−(m)
C ⊢ Sk−(m) C ⊢ {pk(k−′),m′} (∗′ ≐ ∗) (⊢TS)C ⊢ {pk(k−),m}
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Lab. asym.
enc. (⊢*L) C ⊢m C ⊢ k+ C ⊢ n (⊢CL)C ⊢ Ek+(m)n
C ⊢ Epk(k−)(m)n
(⊢EL)C ⊢ n
C ⊢ Epk(k−)(m)n C ⊢ k−
(⊢EL’)C ⊢mC ⊢ Epk(k−)(m)n C ⊢ k−′ (k−′ ≐ k−) (⊢TL)C ⊢ k− Auth KeyAgr (⊢*G)
C ⊢ {k−1 ,n1,pk(k−2 ),n2}
(⊢CG)C ⊢AKA(k−1 ;n1;k−2 ;n2)
C ⊢ {pk(k−1 ),n1,k−2 ,n2}
(⊢CG’)C ⊢AKA(k−1 ;n1;k−2 ;n2)
Anon Cred
(⊢*R) C ⊢ {k
−,m1,m2,n}
(⊢CR)C ⊢ credm1k− (m2;n)
C ⊢ credm1k− (m2;n) C ⊢ {pk(k−′),m′1,m′2} (∗′ ≐ ∗) (⊢TR)C ⊢ {pk(k−),m1,m2}
ZK Proof
(⊢*Z) C ⊢ {m1,m2,m3,m4} (⊢CZ)C ⊢ ZK(m1;m2;m3;m4)
C ⊢ ZK(m1;m2;m3;{np,nv})
(⊢EZ1)C ⊢m3
C ⊢ {ZK(m1;m2;m3;{np,nv}),np}
(⊢EZ2)C ⊢m1C ⊢ ZK(m1;m2;m3;{np,nv})
(⊢EZ3)C ⊢m2
C ⊢ ZK(m1;m2;m3;{np,nv}) C ⊢ n′p (n′p ≐ np) (⊢TZ1)C ⊢ np Cred Iss(⊢*I)
C ⊢ {k−,m1,m2,n}
(⊢CI)C ⊢ ICredm1k− (m2;n})C ⊢ {ICredm1k− (m2;{ni}7i=1),n2}
(⊢EI1)C ⊢ credm1k− (m2;{n2,n5})
C ⊢ {ICredm1k− (m2;{ni}7i=1),n3}
(⊢EI2)C ⊢ {m1,n1,n2}
C ⊢ {ICredm1k− (m2;{ni}7i=1),n6}
(⊢EI3)C ⊢ k−C ⊢ ICredm1k− (m2;{ni}7i=1)
(⊢EI4)C ⊢ {pk(k−),m2,H(m1,n1)}
C ⊢ ICredm1k− (m2;{ni}7i=1) C ⊢ {m′1,n′2} (∗′ ≐ ∗) (⊢TI1)C ⊢ {m1,n2}C ⊢ ICredm1k− (m2;{ni}7i=1) C ⊢ credm′1k−′(m′2;{n′2,n′5}) (∗′ ≐ ∗) (⊢TI2)C ⊢ credm1k− (m2;{n2,n5})
C ⊢ ICredm1k− (m2;{ni}7i=1) C ⊢ n′2 (n′2 ≐ n2) (⊢TI3)C ⊢ n2C ⊢ ICredm1k− (m2;{ni}7i=1) C ⊢ n′3 (n′3 ≐ n3) (⊢TI4)C ⊢ n3
C ⊢ ICredm1k− (m2;{ni}7i=1) C ⊢ n′6 (n′6 ≐ n6) (⊢TI5)C ⊢ n6
Figure 4: Deductive system for detectability: m, mi, n, ni, k−, k+, k−i and ∗′ any context
message; d ∈ Ic ∪Dc any context identifier or data item; p∗ ∈Dc any context data item.∗′ ≐ ∗ means “for any pair of dashed and non-dashed context messages”. Rules (⊢0) to
(⊢TS) explained in Section 3.2.1; rules (⊢CL) to (⊢TI6) in Section 3.2.2.
Example 10 shows a typical example of the use of testing and elimination rules.
Example 10. Consider knowledge base Ccli from Example 8. Then id∣pisu is detectable
from Ccli by the derivation shown in Figure 5. The derivation models the actor testing
whether skey∣⋅⋅ is the decryption key for E′shkey∣⋅(id∣su)∣pi (⊢TE). (Rule (⊢TE) can be
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(⊢0)Ccli ⊢ E′shkey∣⋅(id∣su)∣pi
(⊢0)Ccli ⊢ E′shkey∣⋅(id∣su)∣pi (⊢0)Ccli ⊢ skey∣⋅⋅
(⊢TE)Ccli ⊢ shkey∣pi⋅
(⊢EE)Ccli ⊢ id∣pisu
Figure 5: Derivation of id∣pisu given knowledge base Ccli from Example 8 (see Exam-
ple 10)
H(E′n(m))
E′n(m)
n m
1
1 2
H(E′n(m))@ = H(E′n(m))
H(E′n(m))@1 = E′n(m)
H(E′n(m))@11 = n
H(E′n(m))@12 = m
Figure 6: Parse tree of message H(E′n(m)) (left) and submessages (right)
applied because shkey∣pi⋅ ≐ skey∣⋅⋅.) After learning that it is, the actor can decrypt the
message (⊢EE).
We assume that for any cryptographic operation modelled by an elimination rule,
there is a corresponding testing rule. (This is an over-estimation in case the actor cannot
distinguish between a failed and successful cryptographic operation, e.g. when certain
kinds of encryption schemes are used in which the plaintext resulting from decryption
cannot be recognised as valid.) On the other hand, not all testing rules testing have a
corresponding elimination rule, e.g., rule (⊢TS) for signature verification.
Differently from other deductive systems, we introduce two additional general
rules: (⊢Eψ) to reason about properties of attributes and (⊢C) to reason about con-
tents of messages. Rule (⊢Eψ) states that any properties that apply to an attribute can
be detected from the attribute. Note that, because the rule only applies if image ψi(d)
under the partial function ψi is defined, only applicable properties can be detected.
Rule (⊢C) covers knowledge obtained by comparing contents of different messages.
Before we can discuss rule (⊢C) in detail, we first need to formalise the notion of
submessages of a message. A message m has a natural syntactic structure according to
the grammar in Figure 4. This structure can be represented by a parse tree, in which
the nodes are the submessages of m; the root is the message m itself. We write m@z
for the submessage of m at path z from m in its parse tree; the empty path is denoted
ε . Figure 6 shows the parse tree of a message (left) and the corresponding formal
representation of its submessages (right).
If two context messages m1 and m2 are content equivalent, then by the uniqueness
assumption, their respective submessages are also content equivalent. That is, if m1 ≐
m2 and m1@z and m2@z are defined (i.e., there exists a submessage at path z), then
m1@z ≐m2@z. Also, if m1 and m2 contain data items satisfying a property ψk, the
content equivalence of that property is also implied. Formally:
Definition 11. The pair (m1,m2) is evidence for n1 ≐ n2, denoted (m1 ≐m2)⇒ (n1 ≐
n2), if one of the following two conditions holds:
• m1 ≐m2, and for some z, m1@z = n1 and m2@z = n2;
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(⊢0)Ca ⊢ id∣η2
(⊢0)Ca ⊢ id∣η2 (⊢0)Ca ⊢ age∣η3
(⊢CC)Ca ⊢ {id∣η2 ,age∣η3 }
(⊢CH)Ca ⊢H({id∣η2 ,age∣η3 }) (⊢0)Ca ⊢H({id,age})∣η1
(⊢C)Ca ⊢ id∣η1
Figure 7: Derivation of id∣η1 given knowledge base Ca = {H({id,age})∣η1 , id∣η2 ,age∣η3 }
(see Example 12).
• (m1 ≐m2)⇒ (n′1 ≐ n′2), and for some i, n1 =ψi(n′1) and n2 =ψi(n′2).
The “content analysis” inference rule (⊢C) then states that if an actor can derive
evidence (m1,m2) for n1 ≐ n2 and he can derive a message with n1 in it, then he can
derive the same message with n1 replaced by n2, and vice versa. The following example
shows how (⊢C) models an actor determining a piece of information by reasoning
about its contents:
Example 12. Consider knowledge base
Ca = {H({id,age})∣η1 , id∣η2 ,age∣η3 },
where id∣η1 ≐ id∣η2 and age∣η1 ≐ age∣η3 . Intuitively, an actor can learn id∣η1 from this knowl-
edge base: he can construct the hash H({id∣η2 ,age∣η3 }), note that it has the same con-
tents as H({id,age})∣η1 , and thus infer that id∣η1 must have the same contents as id∣η2 ,
which he knows.
This series of reasoning step is captured in the derivation shown in Figure 7. Namely,Ca ⊢H({id,age})∣η1 holds, and by (⊢CC), (⊢CH) we have Ca ⊢H({id∣η2 ,age∣η3 }). By
Definition 11, the pair (H({id,age})∣η1 ,H({id∣η2 ,age∣η3 })) is evidence for id∣η1 ≐ id∣η2
(as well as for age∣η1 ≐ age∣η3 ). By (⊢C), he can then deduce id∣η1 . (In the same way,
also Ca ⊢ age∣η1 follows.)
3.2.2 Inference Rules for Non-Standard Primitives
We now discuss the inference rules for the non-standard primitives modelled in this
paper. Labelled asymmetric encryption is similar to normal asymmetric encryption;
note that the label can be derived from the encryption (⊢EL’), but to change it, the
plaintext is needed, i.e., the label is unmodifiably attached. To derive a session key
using authenticated key agreement, an actor needs to know one of the private keys
used, the other public key, and both parties’ randomness (⊢CG), (⊢CG’).
Messages ZK(. . .) and ICred∗∗(. . .) represent the complete transcripts of instances
of zero-knowledge proofs and credential issuing protocols, respectively. In particular,
the construction rules for these messages state which inputs are required to build the
complete transcript. (When such a protocol is run, two different parties each provide
part of the input; this is captured by traces, see Section 4.)
The inference rules for ZK given in our deductive system model the privacy aspects
of a large family of ZK proofs known as “Σ-protocols” [41]. Σ-protocols exist for many
properties; in particular, they are used to prove properties of anonymous credentials [8].
The randomness for Σ-protocols is of the form {np,nv}, representing contributions by
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the prover and verifier, respectively. Apart from the usual construction rule, there are
three elimination rules: (⊢EZ1) states that the property proven by a ZK proof can be
seen from its transcript; (⊢EZ2) states that the prover’s secret can be derived from the
prover’s randomness; and (⊢EZ3) states that the public information can be derived.
Testing rule (⊢TZ1) can be applied to obtain the prover’s randomness. We assume that
parties do not reuse their randomness; also, because we are only interested in privacy
aspects, we only consider deriving randomness if that randomness can be used to derive
other information. See Appendix B.1 for details.
The inference rules for cred and ICred model anonymous credentials and their issu-
ing protocol based on SRSA-CL signatures [8]. Anonymous credentials can be verified
to correspond to a given verification key, message and secret identifier (⊢TR). Anony-
mous credentials are usually derived from the transcript of its issuing protocol (⊢EI1)
by the user (the issuer does not know n2 and so does not learn the credential); but
they can also be constructed directly from its components (⊢CR). Similarly for the
issuing protocol transcript itself (⊢CI). Before the issuing protocol takes place, the
user needs to have sent a randomised commitment H(m1,n1) to her secret identifier
to the issuer. During the protocol, additional randomness n2, ...,n8 is generated by the
two parties; n1, ...,n8 together form the randomness component of the ICred primitive.
Inference rules (⊢EI2) and (⊢EI3) model the inference of secret information from the
transcript using randomness. A credential issuing protocol transcript allows for deriv-
ing and testing of various nonces and information used ((⊢EI4); (⊢TI1)–(⊢TI5)). As
with our model of ZK proofs, we only consider rules needed to infer personal infor-
mation, and assume non-reuse of randomness. In Appendix B.2 we explain why these
rules accurately capture privacy aspects.
3.2.3 Associability and View
Having discussed detectability, we consider the other part of an actor view: associabil-
ity. We determine the associability relation corresponding to a knowledge base C by
finding out which identifiers and entities are known to be equivalent in C:
Definition 13. Let C be a knowledge base. The associability relation↔ corresponding
to C is the equivalence relation on Oc obtained by evaluating the following rules:
1. For all ds∣ηk ,ds∣ζl ∈ C ∩Ec: if σ(ds∣ηk ) = σ(ds∣ζl ), then ds∣ηk ↔ ds∣ζl ;
2. For all x∣ηk ,y∣ηk ∈Oc: x∣ηk ↔ y∣ηk ;
3. If C ⊢m1, C ⊢m2, and (m1 ≐m2)⇒ (i1 ≐ i2) for i1, i2 ∈ Ic, then i1↔ i2.
and taking the reflexive, symmetric, transitive closure.
The first point states that any known context entities representing the same entity
can be associated; the second point states that all information from the same context can
be associated. The third point captures associations by identifiers. Actors do not need
to be able to detect the identifier: instead, it is sufficient to detect evidence for content
equivalence (Definition 11). The following example demonstrates the definition.
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Example 14. We determine the associability relation↔cli corresponding to the knowl-
edge base Ccli from Example 8:
Ccli = {ds∣ab12,teln∣ab12,ds∣ab4 , id∣ab4 ,skey∣⋅⋅, ip∣⋅me, ip∣⋅srv,
pk(k−∣⋅srv), ip∣picl , ip∣pisrv,E′shkey∣⋅(id∣su)∣pi ,
E′shkey∣⋅({age∣su,n∣⋅,Sk−∣srv({age∣su,n∣⋅})})∣pi}.
Rule 2 from Definition 13 allows association of information from the same context;
thus, e.g., ds∣ab4 ↔cli id∣ab4 . Rule 3 allows association of context identifiers using evi-
dence of content equivalence. For instance, clearly, Ccli ⊢ id∣ab4 , Ccli ⊢ id∣pisu (see Exam-
ple 10), and (id∣ab4 ≐ id∣pisu)⇒ (id∣ab4 ≐ id∣pisu), hence id∣ab4 ↔ id∣pisu. In fact, all context
items about Alice that occur in Ccli turn out to be mutually associable. However, rule 1
for associating entities does not apply since, e.g., σ(ds∣ab12) ≠ σ(ds∣ab4 ). Continuing in
this way, the items detectable from Ccli form the following equivalence classes under↔cli: {ds∣ab12,teln∣ab12} {ds∣ab4 , id∣ab4 , id∣pisu,age∣pisu}{ip∣picl , ip∣⋅me,} {ip∣⋅srv,k−∣⋅srv, ip∣pisrv,k−∣pisrv},
with data subjects Bob, Alice, the client, and the server, respectively.
Note that↔ is intentionally defined on all context-layer items, and not just on de-
tectable context-layer items. The following example shows how this broader definition
allows additional inferences to be made:
Example 15. Let Ca = {{Eshakey∣⋅(id∣1), d∣1}∣η , {Eshakey∣⋅(id∣1), d′∣1}∣χ} be a knowl-
edge base, where shakey∣η⋅ ≐ shakey∣χ⋅ and id∣η1 ≐ id∣χ1 . Let ↔a be the associability
relation corresponding to Ca. Intuitively, even if the key used in the encryptions in Ca
is unknown, the fact that they have the same contents means that the two identifiers,
and hence also the two data items d∣η1 , d′∣χ1 , must have the same data subject. Indeed,
because (Eshakey∣⋅(id∣1)∣η ≐ Eshakey∣⋅(id∣1)∣χ)⇒ (id∣η1 ≐ id∣χ1 ),
rule 3 from Definition 13 gives id∣η1 ↔a id∣χ1 ; by rule 2 and transitivity, d∣η1 ↔a d′∣χ1 .
We can now define the view corresponding to a knowledge base:
Definition 16. Let C a knowledge base. The view V corresponding to C is the view
V = (O,↔), where O = {p ∈ Ic∪Dc ∣ C ⊢ p}∪(C ∩Ec), and↔ is as in Definition 13.
Example 17. We determine the view Vcli = (Ocli,↔cli) corresponding to the knowledge
base Ccli from Example 8. First, let us consider the view of the client on Alice and Bob.
On Alice, we have id∣pisu ∈Ocli because Ccli ⊢ id∣pisu, as shown in Example 10. Similarly,
ds∣ab4 , id∣ab4 ,age∣pisu ∈ Ocli, and as we saw in Example 14, they are mutually associable.
On Bob, the two items ds∣ab12 and teln∣ab12 are detectable and associable. In fact, the
client’s view on Alice and Bob is as in Figure 3.
Apart from this, the client’s view also contains knowledge about the client and
server. Namely, in both cases, it contains two associable context-layer representations
of the communication address: ip∣⋅me, ip∣picl ∈Ocli on the client, and ip∣⋅srv, ip∣pisrv ∈Ocli on
the server.
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1: {Let ⊧ denote the deductive system without the content analysis rule}
2: for all context items m′: m′ ≐ m, Ca ⊧m′ do
3: for all context items p,p′: m@z = p, m′@z = p′, p ≠ p′ do
4: {Find sequence of evidence for p ≐ p′ using breadth-first search}
5: Q← {p} {queue of items to check}; P← {} {already checked}; found← false
6: while Q ≠ {}∧¬found do
7: q← pop(Q); P← P∪{q} {move q from queue to already checked}
8: if q = p′ then found← true;break {evidence for p ≐ p′ found} end if
9: for all context items q′: q′ occurs in message in Ca, q′ ≐ q, q′ ∉ P∪Q do
10: {Try to find evidence for q ≐ q′}
11: for all context items n: Ca ⊧ n, n is minimal w.r.t. q do
12: if ∃n′ ∶ Ca ⊧ n′ ∶ (n ≐ n′)⇒ (q ≐ q′) then Q←Q∪{q′} end if
13: end for
14: for all context items n′: Ca ⊧ n′, n′ is minimal w.r.t. q′ do
15: if ∃n ∶ Ca ⊧ n ∶ (n ≐ n′)⇒ (q ≐ q′) then Q←Q∪{q′} end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: end while
19: if ¬found then break {No such p′ found: try next m′} end if
20: end for
21: return true{Actor has evidence that m ≐ m′ for a m′ such that Ca ⊧m′}
22: end for
23: return false{For all m′ such that m ≐ m′, Ca ⊧m′: actor has no evidence for m ≐ m′}
Figure 8: Algorithm implementing the deductive system: given knowledge base Ca and
context message m, check whether Ca ⊢m
3.3 Deciding Detectability and Linkability
In this section, we present the algorithms to decide detectability and linkability
used in our tool. Our tool consists of a series of Prolog scripts2 for the automatic
verification of privacy requirements for a set of architectures. The most technically
challenging part of this task is to compute the views of actors (i.e., the sets of detectable
items and associability relations) from their knowledge bases. Here, we describe our
algorithms and their efficiency in general terms; for details, refer to the documentation
of the implementation.
Our deductive system is essentially a traditional deductive system [37, 49] to which
testing rules and the content analysis rule have been added. Let us first ignore content
analysis, and only consider the construction, testing and elimination rules. Construc-
tion rules generally derive messages from submessages; testing and elimination rules
derive submessages from messages using some “additional prerequisites” (e.g., the key
for the decryption rule (⊢EE)). As testing/elimination and construction cancel each
other out, there is no point in applying testing/elimination to the result of construction
rule. Thus, to check the derivability of a message m, we try to find a message n in
which it occurs as submessage, and try to derive m from it using elimination and test-
ing. If this does not work, we repeat the procedure for m’s submessages: if successful,
then m can be obtained from them with a construction rule.
While trying elimination or testing rules, we need to check the derivability of the
additional prerequisites n. We claim that this check can be done at the contents layer
2The implementation, along with its documentation, can be downloaded at http://www.mobiman.me/
publications/downloads/.
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(so a simple deductive system suffices). For the testing rule this is clear; however, it
also holds for elimination rules because their additional prerequisites can always be
obtained from a content equivalent message using the testing rule.
Thus, in terms of evaluation, our deductive system differs from standard systems
in two ways. First, for elimination rules, the additional prerequisites are evaluated
not using the deductive system itself, but using a (standard) deductive system at the
contents layer. Second, testing rules are added which are evaluated in the same way as
elimination rules. Intuitively, our deductive system is thus not much harder to evaluate
than a corresponding standard deductive system. (However, typically it will be run on
a larger message set because information has multiple representations.)
We now turn our implementation of the deductive system without content analysis
into an implementation of the full deductive system. Note that any deduction in the
full deductive system can be transformed into a deduction deriving the same message
satisfying the following conditions:
• After content analysis rules, no other rules are applied to a message
• In any application of (⊢C), the message n2 and the message n1 from which it is
derived only differ by one context item at one position
• In any application of (⊢C), the messages m1 and m2 are derived without content
analysis; also, m1 is minimal with respect to n1 in the sense that no elimination
or testing rule can be applied to it to obtain a submessage containing n1; and/or
n2 is minimal with respect to m2.
The algorithm in Figure 8 is an imperative translation of our Prolog implementation; by
the above properties, it implements derivability in our full deductive system. Namely,
to derive m from a given knowledge base Ca, it takes all messages m′ ≐m such thatCa ⊢m′, and tries to obtain m′ from m by content analysis in a context-item-by-context-
item fashion. For all positions z at which m and m′ differ, the algorithm performs a
breadth-first search for messages obtained from m by content analysis at position z,
until it finds m with m@z replaced by m′@z. The breadth-first search is performed by
first searching for a minimal message using testing and elimination rules (lines 10 and
13); and then searching for a content equivalent message using testing, elimination and
construction rules (lines 11 and 14). We did not optimise this algorithm in terms of
complexity. Indeed, in practice, most context items are content equivalent only to few
other items, so the search space for the algorithm is very limited.
The algorithm for checking the associability of two contexts is similar to the pre-
vious algorithm. In particular, it starts with one context (η ,k) and uses breadth-first
search to find associable contexts. This involves finding all identifiers and entities that
occur in (η ,k) and all other contexts in which that identifier/entity occurs. The algo-
rithm then searches evidence for content equivalence of the different representations of
the identifier/entity.
4 States, Traces, and System Evolution
In this section, we complete our formal framework for the analysis of data minimisation
by modelling communication in an information system. In Section 3, we showed how
to determine what knowledge of personal information actors have given their knowl-
edge bases. In this section, we show how these knowledge bases, collected in a state,
can be derived from a model of exchanged messages given as traces. (The approach of
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our framework is to model messages based on protocol descriptions. In an alternative
type of analysis, the knowledge base of an actor could be derived from communication
logs and then analysed using the methods presented in Section 3.)
A state collects the knowledge of all actors in an information system at a certain
point in time. Each actor has his own knowledge base. The knowledge about personal
information by an actor, captured by his view, follows from his knowledge base. The
knowledge of coalitions of actors follows from the union of their respective knowledge
bases:
Definition 18. Let A be a set of actors, and I an information model.
• A state of I involving A is a collection {Cx}x∈A of knowledge bases about I.
• The view of actor a ∈A in state {Cx}x∈A is the view corresponding to knowledge
base Ca (Definition 16).
• The view of coalition {a1, . . . ,ak} ⊂ A of actors in state {Cx}x∈A is the view
corresponding to knowledge base Ca1 ∪ . . .∪Cak .
We assume that information model I is fixed. That is, changes in knowledge during
the system evolution are modelled by different states of the same information model I.
A trace is a series of communication steps. Each communication step is modelled
by a message transmission involving two parties that both use a particular communi-
cation address modelled as a context identifier. We consider three types of message
transmissions. The simplest type (1) captures an actor using address a to send a mes-
sage m to another actor using address b. Two other types model the execution of
cryptographic protocols: type (2) denotes a zero-knowledge proof with prover using
address a and verifier using address b; type (3) denotes a credential issuing protocol
with user a and issuer b.
Definition 19. A message transmission is of one of the following three types:
(1) a→ b ∶m; (2) a↦ b ∶ ZK(m1;m2;m3;m4);(3) a↦ b ∶ ICredm1m2(m3;m4),
with a,b context identifiers, and mi context messages.
Definition 20. A trace T is a sequence t1;⋯;tk of message transmissions.
States evolve by traces so that the actors involved learn the messages exchanged:
Definition 21. An evolution from state {C0x}x∈A into state {Ckx}x∈A by trace t1;⋯;tk is
a series of steps (let ti = ai→ bi ∶mi or ti = ai↦ bi ∶mi):
{C0x}x∈A t1→ {C1x}x∈A t2→⋯ tn→ {Cnx}x∈A,
where for every actor z ∈ A, Ciz = Ci−1z ∪ {ai,bi,mi} if z↔ σ(ai) or z↔ σ(bi), andCiz = Ci−1z otherwise.
The following example demonstrates traces, states, and message transmissions.
Example 22. Consider again the PI model from Example 2, extended into an informa-
tion model in Example 8. We model a complete system evolution as a trace executed
from an initial state.
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We are interested in the knowledge of two actors A = {cli,srv}: the client and
server. The initial state {C0x}x∈A consists of initial knowledge of the client and server.
As discussed before, this needs to include all used communication addresses and keys.
As in Example 8, for the client we take:
C0cli = {ds∣ab12,teln∣ab12,ds∣ab4 , id∣ab4 ,skey∣⋅⋅, ip∣⋅me,
ip∣⋅srv,pk(k−∣⋅srv)}.
Similarly, for the server we define:
C0srv = {key∣db1 ,col1∣db1 ,col1∣db2 ,key∣db2 ,n∣⋅⋅,skey∣⋅⋅, ip∣⋅srv,k−∣⋅srv}.
(n∣⋅⋅ is the nonce from the server’s reply.) The communication described in Example 8
is now formalised by trace t consisting of the following message transmissions:
ip∣⋅cli→ ip∣⋅srv ∶ E′shkey∣⋅(id∣su)∣pi ;
ip∣⋅srv→ ip∣⋅cli ∶ E′shkey∣⋅({age∣su,n∣⋅,Sk−∣srv({age∣su,n∣⋅})})∣pi .
Then, state {C0x}x∈A evolves by t into state {Cx}x∈A, where:Csrv =C0srv∪{ip∣picli, ip∣pisrv,E′shkey∣⋅(id∣su)∣pi ,
E′shkey∣⋅({age∣su,n∣⋅,Sk−∣srv({age∣su,n∣⋅})})∣pi},Ccli =C0cli∪{ip∣picli, ip∣pisrv,E′shkey∣⋅(id∣su)∣pi ,
E′shkey∣⋅({age∣su,n∣⋅,Sk−∣srv({age∣su,n∣⋅})})∣pi}.
Note that Ccli is as in Example 8. The views of cli, srv and the coalition {cli,srv} about
Alice and Bob in this state are as shown in Figure 3.
5 Case Study: Privacy in Identity Management Sys-
tems
Having described our privacy comparison framework, we now introduce a case study to
demonstrate its operation. In Sections 2–4, we have presented the various formalisms
needed to perform the four steps of our privacy comparison framework (Figure 1). In
the case study, we will demonstrate these four steps by comparing the data minimisa-
tion characteristics of several identity management (IdM) systems. In this section, we
introduce the case study. First, we provide an overview of IdM systems (§5.1). Then,
we discuss the requirements related to privacy by data minimisation that are relevant
for IdM systems (§5.2); and present the four IdM systems we analyse (§5.3).
5.1 Identity Management Systems
As providers of on-line services are offering more and more customisation to their
users, they need to collect more and more of their personal information. Tradition-
ally, each service provider would manage the accounts of users separately. How-
ever, this identity management model, called the isolated user identity management
model [57], has disadvantages for both users and service providers: the user has to
manually provide and update her information and keep authentication tokens for each
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Figure 9: Taxonomy of IdM systems
service provider, whereas it is hard for the service provider to obtain guarantees that
the information given by the user is correct.
This problem is commonly addressed using an Identity Management (IdM) Sys-
tem. Intuitively, the task of managing and endorsing identity information is delegated
to identity providers. Identity management is split up in two phases: registration and
service provision. At registration, users establish accounts at (possibly multiple) iden-
tity providers. (This includes identification: i.e., the user transfers her attributes to the
identity provider, and the identity provider possibly checks them. However, both the
transfer and checking of attributes performed by the identity provider are out of scope
of this work.) Service provision is the phase when a user requests a service from a
service provider: at this point, user attributes required for the service provision need to
be collected and sent to the service provider.
IdM systems can be divided into two main categories [11] depending on whether
or not the identity providers are involved in the service provision phase: credential-
focused and relationship-focused systems (also know as network-based and claim-
based systems [3]). Figure 9 shows a taxonomy of IdM systems.
In credential-focused IdM systems, the user gets long-term credentials from the
identity provider in the registration phase that she can directly present to the ser-
vice providers in the service provision phase. These credentials contain her identity
attributes. We can distinguish between two mechanisms employed to prevent the
user from tampering with them, namely cryptography and tamper-resistant devices.
Credential-focused systems relying on cryptography include CardSpace [72], U-Prove
[75] and Identity Mixer [8]. The system presented in [100] relies on the use of a smart-
card as a tamper-resistant device.
In relationship-focused IdM systems, in contrast, identity providers present the at-
tributes to service providers. During the registration phase, identity providers establish
shared identifiers to refer to each other’s identity of the user. During the service pro-
vision phase, the user authenticates to an identity provider. The identity provider then
sends attributes to the service provider (possibly indirectly via the user). If needed,
the shared identifiers established during registration are used to collect (or aggregate
[31]) attributes held by other identity providers without the user having to authenticate
to them as well. The combination of reliance on authentication performed by another
party and exchange of identity information is sometimes referred to as federated iden-
tity management [57, 87]. (Note that this term is also used to describe the general con-
cept of sharing information between different domains [3] or the mere use of multiple
identity providers [1]. To avoid confusion, we will not use it further.) Relationship-
focused systems include Liberty Alliance [54], Shibboleth [47], and the linking service
model [31].
Because in IdM systems, large amounts of personal information are processed by
many different parties, privacy has become a major concern [53, 90]. In such systems,
privacy threats posed by authorised insiders are nowadays considered to be a criti-
cal problem besides outsider attacks on cryptographic protocols [52]. Insiders may
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compile comprehensive user profiles to sell or use for secondary purposes such as
marketing. These profiles can include sensitive information that is explicitly trans-
ferred by the user, but also information that is transferred implicitly [90]. For in-
stance, the mere fact that a user performed a transaction at a certain service provider
may be privacy-sensitive. In addition, profiles held by different parties may be com-
bined [90] to compile even more comprehensive profiles. Privacy-enhancing IdM sys-
tems (e.g., [8, 31, 100]) aim to minimise the amount of information disclosed as well
as prevent that different pieces of information can be linked together [53].
5.2 Requirements
We now present a set of privacy requirements for IdM systems. We have elicited these
requirements by analysing the information that actors can learn; considering which of
this knowledge should be avoided; and systematically grouping this knowledge into
requirements according to what kind of knowledge it is, and who should or should not
learn it. We validate our set of requirements in two different ways. First, we check if
they cover relevant privacy requirements discussed in the literature. For this, we have
studied taxonomies of privacy in identity management [11, 53] and the proposals for
the identity management systems analysed in this paper [8, 31, 100], and verified if
all requirements discussed in these works are covered by our requirements. Second,
we check if they cover all possible situations expressible in our model that can lead to
privacy risks. For this, we have systematically considered all elementary detectability,
linkability and involvement requirements expressible in our model, checked which of
these can lead to privacy risks, and verified that the relevant ones are covered by our
requirements.
Table 2 lists our privacy requirements, also showing in which existing works they
are discussed. We first present our requirements, then discuss if they cover all rele-
vant requirements from the literature mentioned above. The analysis of coverage of
situations expressible in our model is presented in Section 6.2.
The basic functional requirement for IdM systems is that the service provider learns
the attributes it needs [12]: attribute exchange (AX). Note that in one service provision,
a service provider may need attributes from several identity providers.
Privacy requirements cover that certain personal information should not be learned
by certain actors. Privacy by data minimisation attempts to minimise the amount of
information learned, and the extent to which it can be linked together [53]. The first
aspect, information learned, can be further divided into explicitly and implicitly trans-
ferred information [90]. Detectability requirements capture explicitly transferred in-
formation: information about the user’s attributes. Involvement requirements capture
information about whether actors know about each other’s involvement with the user:
a kind of implicitly transferred personal information. The second aspect is captured in
linkability requirements: namely, requirements that (combinations of) parties should
be able to link personal information from different sessions, databases, etc. as little as
possible.
We define three detectability requirements. The first are about the service provider
learning no more than strictly necessary: no attribute that he does not need to know (ir-
relevant attribute undetectability, SID), and no complete attribute value if all he needs
to know is whether or not an attribute satisfies a certain property [8] (property-attribute
undetectability, SPD). These properties limit the user profile a service provider can
construct. In addition, IdM systems should guarantee that identity providers do not
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Functional requirements Description References
Attribute exchange (AX) The service provider learns the value of the required at-
tributes/properties of the user requesting the service.
[8, 12, 31, 77,
100]
Privacy requirements Description
Irrelevant attribute undetectability (SID) The service provider does not learn anything about attribute val-
ues irrelevant to the transaction.
[8, 12, 77, 100]
Property-attribute undetectability (SPD) The service provider does not learn anything about attributes
apart from the properties he needs to know.
[8, 12, 77, 100]
IdP attribute undetectability (ID) Identity providers do not learn anything about the user’s at-
tributes from other identity providers.
-
Mutual IdP involvement undetectability
(IM)
One identity provider does not learn whether a given user also
has an account at another identity provider.
[31]
IdP-SP involvement undetectability (ISM) Identity providers do not learn which service providers a user
uses.
-
Session unlinkability (SL) A service provider cannot link different sessions of the same
user.
[8, 12, 53, 31,
100]
IdP service access unlinkability (IL) Identity providers cannot link service access to the user profile
they manage.
[53]
IdP profile unlinkability (IIL) Collaborating identity providers cannot link user profiles. [53, 100]
IdP-SP unlinkability (ISL) Identity providers and service provider cannot link service ac-
cesses to user profile at identity provider.
[8, 53, 100]
Accountability requirements Description
Anonymity revocation (AR) Service provider and identity providers (possibly with help from
trusted third party) can reconstruct link between service access
and user profile.
[8, 12, 53, 100]
Table 2: Requirements for IdM systems
learn any value or property of attributes stored at other identity identity providers: we
call this requirement IdP attribute undetectability (ID).
Involvement requirements address the fact that the mere interaction of a user with
certain identity or service providers implies a business relation which can be privacy-
sensitive. For instance, ownership of credentials can be sensitive [86] in domains such
as healthcare, insurance, or finance. In addition, even if individual credentials are not
sensitive, the precise combination of credentials held by a user may help identify her.
It is natural in identity management that the service provider learns which identity
providers certify the user’s attributes: this allows him to judge their correctness. How-
ever, one can aim to achieve that identity providers do not know the identity of other
identity providers the user has an account at [31]: we define this as mutual IdP involve-
ment undetectability (IM). In the same way, a user might want to keep hidden from her
identity providers the fact that she interacts with a certain service provider: we call this
requirement IdP-SP involvement undetectability (ISM).
Linkability is another fundamental privacy concern because it determines what user
profiles can be constructed from the data that is collected [79]. To prevent a service
provider from accumulating (behavioural) information, an IdM system should ensure
it cannot link different service provisions to the same user: session unlinkability (SL).
Indeed, in many cases the service provider does not need to know the identity of the
user: for instance, if a user wishes to read an on-line article, the only information that
is required is that she has a valid subscription.
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Another concern is that parties can build more comprehensive user profiles by shar-
ing their personal information. To prevent this, they should not know which profiles are
about the same user [53]. A very strong privacy guarantee in this vein is that identity
providers and service providers cannot link service provisions to the user: IdP-SP un-
linkability (ISL). IdP profile unlinkability (IIL) is a weaker privacy guarantee requiring
that two collaborating identity providers (without help from the service provider) can-
not link their profiles. IdP service access unlinkability (IL) is about the link between a
service provision and the user profile at an identity provider, thus measuring whether
identity providers are aware of individual service provisions.
An accountability requirement counterbalances the privacy guaranteed by the ISL
requirement. Namely, if the user misbehaves, it should be possible to identify her [8].
Several IdM systems [8, 100] introduce a trusted third party that, in such cases, can help
with the identification. The anonymity revocation (AR) requirement states that, possi-
bly with the help of this trusted third party, the service provider and identity providers
are able to revoke the anonymity of a transaction. (Note that in particular, AR also holds
if the service provider and identity providers can revoke anonymity without needing the
trusted third party.)
When comparing our requirements to those found in existing taxonomies [12, 53],
we find that our requirements are generally more detailed. In [12], three requirement
on data minimisation are presented: conditional release, selective disclosure, and un-
linkability. These three requirements correspond to anonymity revocation and IdP-
SP unlinkability; irrelevant attribute and property-attribute undetectability; and session
unlinkability, respectively (for selective disclosure, the authors do not distinguish be-
tween attributes and properties). The authors also mention policy support, which we
do not cover. On the other hand, our other requirements are not addressed. In [53],
“user-controlled linkage of personal data” is mentioned as the underlying principle of
privacy-enhancing identity management. This includes our unlinkability properties (al-
though [53] does not identify them separately), but also a “control” aspect of privacy
which we do not cover. The authors of [53] also stress that the desired degree of linka-
bility depends on the application, mentioning revocation in particular.
As shown in the table, many of our requirements are discussed by designers of
IdM systems [8, 31, 100]. We compare our requirements to those claimed by designers
(including the ones we do not cover) when discussing these systems in Section 5.3.
5.3 Four Systems
We now present the four IdM systems we formally analyse. We consider one traditional
system, smart certificates [77], for whose development privacy was not a primary con-
cern; it can be classified as credential-focused and relying on cryptography. We then
consider three systems designed with privacy in mind: the linking service model [31],
a relationship-focused IdM system; Identity Mixer [8], a credential-focused system
relying on cryptographic protocols; and a credential-focused IdM system based on
smartcards [100] we will refer to as the Smartcard scheme.
For our analysis, we aimed to cover differ kinds of IdM systems that exist in the lit-
erature. In particular, this means selecting credential-focused and relationship-focused
systems [3, 12]. For the former type, Identity Mixer has received a lot of attention in the
research community. For the latter type, the linking service is one of few proposals sup-
porting multiple identity providers that takes privacy into account [31]. We then also
included the smartcard scheme because it is a recent proposal in a completely different
direction than the previous two. Of course, our formal results are about these particular
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(a) Registration phase (b) Service provision phase
Figure 10: Smart certificates
systems; however, when analysing the results, we will also informally discuss to what
extent they generalise to similar systems.
We now briefly discuss these systems and the privacy guarantees that they have
been designed to provide.
5.3.1 Smart Certificates
Park et al. [77] proposed an IdM system built on top of a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). In a PKI, a certificate authority (CA) issues certificates stating that a certain
public key belongs to a certain user. A user authenticates by proving knowledge of the
secret key corresponding to this public key. Identity providers issue certificates that
link attributes to the public key certificate. In our analysis, we consider one particu-
lar variant described in [77]: the user-pull model with long-lived certificates obtained
during registration.
The flow of information is summarised in Figure 10. In the registration phase (Fig-
ure 10(a)), the user gets an attribute certificate from an identity provider (the “attribute
server” in [77]), which enables her to present her attributes to others. This involves
three steps: (1) the user presents her public key certificate; (2) she proves that she also
knows the corresponding secret key (this is an interactive protocol shown as a two-
sided arrow in the figure); and (3) the attribute server issues an attribute certificate. The
process is then repeated with other identity providers (steps (4) to (6)). The attributes
in the certificate are signed using the attribute server’s secret key and hence cannot be
tampered with by the user. During service provision (Figure 10(b)), the user exchanges
attributes with the service provider (“web server”) in two steps: (1) she presents her
public key certificate and the attribute certificates containing the attributes needed; and
(2) she proves knowledge of the corresponding secret key.
The system presented in [77] is mainly designed to satisfy the attribute exchange
requirement (AX) in a secure way (“the attributes of individual users are provided
securely”). Privacy concerns are addressed in an extension of the system in which
some attributes in a credential are encrypted in such a way that they can only be read
by an “appropriate” server, corresponding to our SID/SPD properties. However, we
will consider the original scheme in which SID/SPD are not claimed to hold.
5.3.2 Linking Service Model
The linking service model [31] is a relationship-focused IdM system. Its main goal
is to facilitate the collection of user attributes from different identity providers in a
privacy-friendly way without the user having to authenticate to each identity provider
separately. To this end, this model includes a linking service which is responsible for
holding the links between profiles of the user at the different identity providers without
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(a) Registration phase (b) Service provision phase
Figure 11: Linking service model
(a) Registration phase (b) Service provision phase
Figure 12: Identity Mixer
knowing any personal information about the user.
The flow of information is summarised in Figure 11. During registration (Fig-
ure 11(a)), the user first creates an anonymous account at the linking service LS. LS
requests the identity providers to authenticate the user; each identity provider generates
a pseudonym for the user and sends it to LS (steps (1) and (2)). (The specific method
of authentication between the user and the identity providers and linking service is out
of our scope.) In the service provision phase (Figure 11(b)), the user authenticates to
one particular identity provider IdP1. IdP1 provides the service provider SP with an
“authentication assertion” containing the attributes requested from it, and a referral to
LS (1). The referral is an encryption of the pseudonym shared between IdP1 and LS
that only LS can decrypt. SP sends this referral to LS (2), which responds by sending a
similar referral to other identity providers (3). Finally, SP requests (4) and obtains (5)
the required attributes from the other identity providers (for simplicity, we just show
one other identity provider in the figure).
The linking service model aims to satisfy the attribute exchange requirement (AX)
as well as a number of privacy requirements [31]. In particular, the main goal of the
linking service model is to guarantee that identity providers do not know the involve-
ment of other identity providers (IM). Moreover, the model aims to achieve session
unlinkability (SL) through the use of random user identifiers. Finally, the linking ser-
vice should not learn the partial identities of the user for the service providers; that is,
it does not learn any personal information about the user. We call this requirement LS
attribute undetectability (LD); it is not listed in Table 2 because it is only relevant for
this system; however, our analysis will include the verification of this requirement.
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(a) Registration phase (b) Service provision phase
Figure 13: Smartcard scheme
5.3.3 Identity Mixer
Identity Mixer [8] is a credential-focused IdM system using a cryptographic primitive
called anonymous credentials. These credentials link attributes to a user identifier,
but are issued by identity providers and shown to service providers using protocols
ensuring that neither party learns that identifier. Thus, nobody but the user knows
whether different issuing or showing protocols were performed by the same user, while
integrity of the attributes is still assured.
Figure 12 shows the information flows in Identity Mixer. During registration (Fig-
ure 12(a)), the user first sends a commitment to her (secret) identifier to an identity
provider IdP1 (1), after which the user and IdP1 together run the credential issuing
protocol (2). From this, the user obtains a credential with her attributes linked to her
secret identifier, without IdP1 learning the identifier. Communication with other iden-
tity providers is analogous (steps (3) and (4)). In the service provision phase (Fig-
ure 12(b)), the user shows information from several credentials to the service provider
SP. She first shows her credential from one identity provider. To this end, she sends a
message containing the attributes she wants to reveal, and “commitments” to the secret
identifier and all other attributes (1). Next, she performs a zero-knowledge proof (2)
which proves to SP that the attributes and commitments come from a valid credential
issued by the identity provider, while revealing nothing else about the credential. Cre-
dentials issued by other identity providers are shown in the same way (steps (3) and
(4)).
Identity Mixer is designed to satisfy a number of privacy requirements [8]. In par-
ticular, it aims to satisfy both session unlinkability and IdP/SP unlinkability (together
called “multi-show unlinkability” in [8]) and irrelevant attribute and property-attribute
undetectability (together called “selective show of data items” in [8]). The system al-
lows for providing the service provider with an encryption of some attributes for a
trusted third party (“conditional showing of data items” in [8]) that can be used for
anonymity revocation. Apart from the data minimisation requirements we defined,
the system additionally allows credential issuing where an identity provider copies
attributes from another certificate without knowing their values (“blind certification”
in [8]). The main motivation for this functionality comes from the use of these cer-
tificates for e-cash [8]. In traditional identity management scenarios, such as ours,
identity providers should know the attributes they endorse, so we do not consider this
requirement in this work.
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Scheme AX AR SID SPD ID IM ISM SL IL IIL ISL
Smart certificates
Linking service model
Identity Mixer
Smartcard scheme
Table 3: Comparison of privacy requirements claimed by the various systems
5.3.4 Smartcard Scheme
Vossaert et al [100] proposed a credential-focused IdM system which relies on PKI
for authentication and on smartcards (or other tamper-resistant devices) to ensure that
attributes are not modified and observed during their transmission from the identity
provider to the service provider. Identity providers and service providers only commu-
nicate via the smartcard, and each has a different pseudonym of the user based on a
secret user identifier stored on the smartcard.
The information flow defined in the scheme is shown in Figure 13. In the reg-
istration phase (Figure 13(a)), the smartcard SC and the first identity provider IdP1
establish a secure, authenticated channel using a key agreement protocol (steps (1) and
(2)). Over this secure channel, SC sends a pseudonym based on its secret identifier spe-
cific for IdP1 (3); IdP1 sends its attributes (4). Registration at other identity providers is
similar (steps (5) to (8)). In a service provision (Figure 13(b)), SC and service provider
SP establish a secure, authenticated channel as in the registration phase (steps (1) and
(2)). SC generates a random session identifier (3); SP then specifies what attributes he
wants, and how long they may have been cached (steps (4) and (5)). SC responds by
giving the requested attributes. For anonymity revocation purposes, this response also
includes Alice’s identifier encrypted for the trusted third party (6).
The system is designed to meet several requirements related to the knowledge of
personal information [100]. The requirements specified correspond to our notions of at-
tribute exchange, session unlinkability, and anonymity revocation. Irrelevant property
and property-attribute undetectability follow from their more general notion of “re-
stricting released personal data”. The Smartcard scheme also aims to fulfil IdP profile
unlinkability and IdP/SP unlinkability by preventing collusion of identity and service
providers.
5.3.5 Privacy Requirements Claimed by Systems
Table 3 summarises the privacy claims for the systems. One goal of our formal analysis
will be to verify whether these claims actually hold. In addition, we will analyse the
systems against the complete range of identified requirements in order to achieve a
comprehensive comparison of their privacy features.
6 Formal Analysis of the Case Study
In this section, we formally analyse and compare the IdM systems presented in the
previous section. To make this comparison, we perform the four steps of our privacy
analysis framework (Figure 1). In Section 6.1, we model the personal information in
a scenario (step 1). In Section 6.2, we model the privacy requirements (step 2; we
also discuss whether the requirements identified in Section 5.2 cover all privacy risks
expressible in our model). In Section 6.3, we model the communication in each IdM
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e ∈ E Actor/entity
al Alice
ii Address provider
is Subscription provider
bs E-book store
tt p Trusted third party
(a) Actors/entities
Dom. Description⋅ identifiers/keys
ι Alice’s knowledge
κ ii’s user database
µ is’s user database
pi registration at ii
η registration at is
ζ ,ξ service provisions
(b) Domains
Domains
Entity ⋅,ι ,κ ,µ pi ,η ,κ ,µ
al al u
ii ii id p1
is is id p2
bs bs sp
tt p tt p tt p
(c) Profiles
{ip∣⋅ii, k−∣⋅ii, ip∣⋅is, k−∣⋅is, ip∣⋅bs, k−∣⋅bs, k−∣⋅tt p}
(d) Information about ii, is, bs, tt p: anybody knows identifiers and public keys pk(k−∣⋅∗); actor knows
own private key
Info al ii is bs Description
al {al∣ιal ,al∣ζu ,al∣ξu} - - - Entity
iii {iii∣ιal , iii∣piu } {iii∣κal , iii∣piu } - - Identifier at ii
d1 d1∣ιal d1∣κal - - City
d2 d2∣ιal d2∣κal - - Age
d2>60 d2>60∣ιal d2>60∣κal - - age “> 60” property
d3 d3∣ιal d3∣κal - - Address
iis {iis∣ιal , iis∣ηu } - {iis∣µal , iis∣ηu } - Identifier at is
d5 d5∣ιal - d5∣µal - Subscription date
d6 d6∣ιal - d6∣µal - Subscription type
d7 - - - {d7∣ζu ,d7∣ξu} Transaction details
ip {ip∣piu , ip∣ηu , ip∣ζu , ip∣ξu} - - - IP address
(e) Information about Alice: each row is a piece of information (for d7 and ip: different pieces of information
in each domain); columns al, ii, is, and bs show the initial knowledge of actors about the information
Figure 14: Schematic representation of PI model and initial actor views
system (step 3). In Section 6.4, we verify which requirements hold in which system,
and analyse the results (step 4).
6.1 Step 1: Model Personal Information in Scenario
Step 1 of our analysis method is to model the personal information in a scenario. The
scenario needs to be designed in such a way that all privacy properties to be verified
(i.e., in this case, the ones in Table 2) can be phrased in terms of personal information
occurring in the scenario. Thus, we include attributes that should be disclosed (for AX),
should not be disclosed (for SPD), and of which only a property should be disclosed
(for SID); and we consider multiple identity providers (for IM, IL, and IIL) and sessions
(for SL). Given these constraints, we design the scenario to look as realistic as possible.
In particular, we consider a scenario with four main actors: a user: Alice, a 65
year-old woman; a service provider: an e-book store; and two identity providers: one
for Alice’s address (the address provider) and one for Alice’s subscription at some
society (the subscription provider). In the registration phase of this scenario, Alice
creates an account at both identity providers. The address provider stores three identity
attributes of the user: the street, city, and age. The subscription provider stores two
user attributes: date of subscription and subscription type.
In the service provision phase, Alice purchases books from the e-book store on
two separate occasions. To this end, she needs to provide her personal information,
endorsed by the identity providers, to the e-book store. The service provider, for statis-
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tical purposes, demands to know the city that Alice comes from. Moreover, the e-store
offers a discount to customers that are over 60 years old. As Alice is 65 years old,
she is eligible for the discount. The e-book store, however, does not necessarily need
to learn her exact birth date or age; Alice can just prove that she is over 60 years old.
Moreover, the e-book store does not need to know that the purchases are both made
by the same user. On the other hand, in case of abuse, the service provider does want
to be able to link the purchase to Alice’s profile at the address provider with the help
of a trusted third party. (Note that the scenario does not cover the separate issue of
anonymous payment of the e-book.)
Our formalisation of this scenario as (views on) a PI model is shown schematically
in Figure 14. Figure 14(a) lists the actors/entities in the system (in this case study,
actors and entities coincide). The trusted third party tt p is included because of the
anonymity revocation requirement; however, note that it only occurs in the Identity
Mixer and Smartcard schemes.
Figures 14(b) and 14(c) summarise the contexts we use to model different repre-
sentations of personal information. Figure 14(b) lists all domains. The “⋅” domain
contains publicly known identifiers for the identity and service providers, and their pri-
vate keys. The ι , κ , and λ domains represent databases of user information held by the
respective parties. The pi , η , ζ , and ξ domains represent the communication protocols
that are executed during the scenario. For simplicity, all communication related to one
service provision is modelled in a single domain. This expresses that parties involved
in service provision without communicating directly (e.g., the linking service and IdP2
in the linking service model) are able to link their views of the protocol. Alternatively,
each pair of communication partners could have a separate domain. Figure 14(c) shows
the profiles representing the actors in the different domains. For instance, in the ⋅, ι ,
κ and λ domains, Alice represented by the al profile; in the pi , η , ζ , and ξ domains,
she is represented by u. By naming these profiles differently, we emphasise that actors
learn the information not as information about Alice, but as information about “the
purchaser in transaction x”, etc.
Figures 14(d) and 14(e) define the pieces of personal information in the scenario,
and the knowledge about them that actors hold in the initial state. For simplicity, we
give an explicit context-layer representation, and use some notational conventions to
implicitly describe the information and contents layers. Namely, when context items
about the same entity using the same variable are denoted in the normal font (e.g. iii∣piu
and iii∣κal), they are equivalent; when denoted in boldface (e.g. ip∣piu , ip∣ηu ), they are
all pairwise non-equivalent. Items of the form i∣∗∗, i∗∣∗∗, k−∣∗∗, and ip∣∗∗ (for any ∗) are
identifiers; items d∗∣∗∗ are data items; other items are non-personal information. All
representations of a single piece of information use the same variable. Because this
scenario includes only one data subject, all pieces of information have unique contents,
i.e., the information and contents layers coincide. We have one attribute property ψ1
representing if an age is over 60. At the information layer, ψ1(d2) = d2>60; at the
context layer, ψ1(d2∣piu ) = d2>60∣piu , and similarly for other contexts.
Figure 14(d) defines the information available about ii, is, and bs. This information
consists of a private key for each of the actors, and an identifier for ii, is, and bs. All
actors know each other’s identifiers and the public keys pk(k−∣⋅∗) corresponding to each
private key; each actor also knows his own private key.
Figure 14(e) defines the personal information known initially about Alice. Each
row except the last two shows different context-layer representations of one piece of
information, indicating which actor initially knows which representation. For instance,
d1 represents a city; Alice knows her city as d1∣ιal and ii knows it as d1∣κal . We assume
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Requirement Formalisation
Attribute exchange (AX) d1∣ζu ,d2>60∣ζu ,d6∣ζu ,d1∣ξu ,d2>60∣ξu ,d6∣ξu ∈ Obs
Anonymity revocation (AR) ∗∣κal ↔{bs,ii,is,tt p} ∗∣ζu ↔{bs,ii,is,tt p} ∗∣ξu
Irrelevant attribute undetectability (SID) d3∣∗∗ ∉ Obs∧d5∣∗∗ ∉ Obs
Property-attribute undetectability (SPD) d2∣∗∗ ∉ Obs
IdP attribute undetectability (ID) d1∣∗∗ ∉ Ois∧d2∣∗∗ ∉ Ois∧d3∣∗∗ ∉ Ois∧
d2>60∣∗∗ ∉ Ois∧d5∣∗∗ ∉ Oii∧d6∣∗∗ ∉ Oii
Mutual IdP involvement undetectability (IM) ¬(∃p ∶ ∗∣⋅is↔ii ∗∣pid p2∧∗∣pu ↔ii ∗∣κal)∧¬(∃p ∶ ∗∣⋅ii↔is ∗∣pid p1∧∗∣pu ↔is ∗∣µal)
IdP-SP involvement undetectability (ISM) ¬(∃p ∶ ∗∣⋅bs↔ii ∗∣psp∧∗∣pu ↔ii ∗∣κal)∧¬(∃p ∶ ∗∣⋅bs↔is ∗∣psp∧∗∣pu ↔is ∗∣µal)
Session unlinkability (SL) ∗∣ζu ↮bs ∗∣ξu
IdP service access undetectability (IL) ∗∣κal ↮ii ∗∣ζu )∧∗∣κal ↮ii ∗∣ξu∧∗∣µal ↮is ∗∣ζu ∧∗∣µal ↮is ∗∣ξu
IdP profile unlinkability (IIL) ∗∣κal ↮{ii,is} ∗∣µal
IdP/SP unlinkability (ISL) ∗∣κal ↮{ii,is,bs} ∗∣ζu ∧∗∣µal ↮{ii,is,bs} ∗∣ζu∧∗∣κal ↮{ii,is,bs} ∗∣ξu ∧∗∣µal ↮{ii,is,bs} ∗∣ξu
Table 4: Formalisation of requirements in our scenario (m↮a n means ¬(m↔a n);∗ means for all possible values)
that the actual attribute exchange between user and identity provider during registration
has already taken place, as shown in the κ and µ domains. In the last two rows, each
context item represents a different piece of information; e.g., the transaction details
d7∣ζu ,d7∣ξu of the two service provisions are different. We assume some initial knowl-
edge about Alice in the pi , η , ζ and ξ domains representing protocols. Knowledge of
iii∣piu , iis∣ηu held by Alice and the respective identity providers represents the fact that
Alice has authenticated to them. In the context of the two service provisions, Alice
knows that she is the data subject (al∣ζu , al∣ξu ); the service provider knows transaction
details d7∣ζu , d7∣ξu . Alice knows her own IP address ip∣∗u , where ∗ ∈ {pi,η ,ζ ,ξ}; note
that it is assumed to change dynamically between sessions.
6.2 Step 2: Model Privacy Requirements
Step 2 of our framework is to formalise the requirements from Table 2 in terms of
actor views. As above, the view of an actor a ∈ A and a coalition A ⊂ A are de-
noted Va = (Oa,↔a) and VA = (OA,↔A), respectively. The formalisation of our re-
quirements in terms of these views is shown in Table 4. AX and AR are detectabil-
ity and linkability requirements (see Section 2.3), respectively. (For AX, note that
bs can always associate the personal information of the user to the purchase because
of the common context (ζ ,u) or (ξ ,u), so we do not check this.) SID, SPD and
SID are undetectability requirements; SL, IL, IIL, and ISL are unlinkability require-
ments. (Un-)detectability requirements are straightforward to formalise; e.g., property-
attribute undetectability means undetectability by bs of the context item d2∣δp in any
context (δ , p). (Un-)linkability requirements translate to contexts not being associable
by an actor or coalition. IM and ISM are non-involvement requirements: formally, they
translate to two associations that should not hold simultaneously; for instance, for IM,
there should be no domain p in which ii can link the id p2 profile to ∣⋅id p2 and the u
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profile to ∣κal .
We now analyse whether the above privacy requirements cover all privacy risks ex-
pressible in our model. To this end, we consider all coalitions and all possible knowl-
edge (in terms of elementary detectability, involvement, and linkability aspects; see
Section 2.3); and verify if they represent a privacy risk, and if so, by which privacy
requirement they are captured. The result is shown in Table 7 (at the end of this paper).
The first group of columns indicates the coalition with respect to which a requirement
is defined; the next groups list the detectability, involvement, and linkability aspects
that it entails.
First consider detectability requirements. With respect to bs, all personal informa-
tion is required to be either detectable by AX, or undetectable by SID and SPD (except
for d7, which bs can always detect by definition of the scenario). Similarly, identity
providers can detect attributes they endorse by definition of the scenario, but no others
by ID. (Undetectability of endorsed attributes would be a requirement for the blind cer-
tification [8] feature of the Identity Mixer scheme as discussed in Section 5.3.3.) There
are no detectability requirements with respect to tt p, or about the transaction details
d7. In fact, these aspects would not produce relevant results because tt p never learns
any attributes, and bs never communicates any transaction details.
Involvement requirements do not cover tt p or al: the involvement of tt p is pub-
licly known, and Alice’s involvement is covered by linkability. For identity providers,
there are involvement requirements about all remaining parties, i.e., the other identity
provider and the service provider. Usually, service providers assess trustworthiness
of user attributes by considering which identity provider endorsed them; hence we do
not regard involvement requirements with respect to the service provider as important.
(Among the analysed systems, only the Smartcard scheme would satisfy them.)
Linkability requirements capture associations by coalitions of actors. Clearly, at
least ii and is are needed to associate κ and µ; IIL states that without help of others,
they cannot. There is no requirement about when bs helps them with this; as it turns
out, this help never makes a difference. Linkability between user databases and service
provisions is defined with respect to the respective identity providers, and with respect
to a coalition of all identity and service providers. Considering other coalitions would
not reveal interesting differences in the systems we analyse. Similarly, no requirement
involves ii or is in linking the service provisions to each other; in practice, an identity
provider would link service provisions to each other by first linking them to its own user
profile, which is covered by IL. Finally, AR requires linking the service provisions to
κ and not to µ; this is an arbitrary choice made in the definition of the scenario.
6.3 Step 3: Model Communication in IdM systems
Step 3 of our framework is to model the communication in the systems we want to
analyse (§5.3). For each system, this formalisation consists of two parts. First, we
define an initial state {C0a}a∈A capturing the initial knowledge of all actors, extending
the knowledge from Figure 14 with respect to the specific system. Second, we define
a trace Scenario that models the communication that takes place in the system in the
system from the initial state when registration at ii, registration at is, and two service
provisions at bs, are consecutively performed.
We introduce the abbreviation MSk−(m) ∶= {m,Sk−(m)} to denote a message along
with its signature, capturing both X.509 certificates [56] and signed SAML assertions
[30].
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C0al = (Fig.14)∪{MSk−∣⋅ca(i∣⋅al ,pk(k−∣⋅u),nc∣⋅⋅),k−∣⋅al ,
nz,a∣pi⋅ ,nz,a∣η⋅ ,nz,a∣ζ⋅ ,nz,a∣ξ⋅ };C0ii = (Fig.14)∪{nz,b∣pi⋅ ,na∣pi⋅ };C0is = (Fig.14)∪{nz,b∣η⋅ ,nb∣η⋅ };C0bs = (Fig.14)∪{nz,b∣ζ⋅ ,nz,b∣ξ⋅ }
Scenario ∶= Reg1∣pi ; Reg2∣η ; ServProv∣ζ ; ServProv∣ξ
Reg1 ∶=
ip∣u → ip∣id p1 ∶MSk−∣ca(i∣u,pk(k−∣u),nc∣⋅); (1)
ip∣u ↦ ip∣id p1 ∶ ZK(k−∣u;pk(k−∣u);∅;{nz,a∣⋅,nz,b∣⋅}); (2)
ip∣id p1 → ip∣u ∶MSk−∣id p1(i∣u,d1∣u,d2∣u,d3∣u,na∣⋅) (3)
Reg2 ∶=
ip∣u → ip∣id p2 ∶MSk−∣ca(i∣u,pk(k−∣u),nc∣⋅); (4)
ip∣u ↦ ip∣id p2 ∶ ZK(k−∣u;pk(k−∣u);∅;{nz,a∣⋅,nz,b∣⋅}); (5)
ip∣ηid p2 → ip∣ηu ∶MSk−∣ηid p2(i∣ηu ,d5∣ηu ,d6∣ηu ,nb∣η⋅ ) (6)
ServProv ∶=
ip∣u → ip∣sp ∶MSk−∣ca(i∣u,pk(k−∣u),nc∣⋅),
ip∣u → ip∣sp ∶MSk−∣id p1(i∣u,d1∣u,d2∣u,d3∣u,na∣⋅), (1)
ip∣u → ip∣sp ∶MSk−∣id p2(i∣u,d5∣u,d6∣u,nb∣⋅);
ip∣u ↦ ip∣sp ∶ ZK(k−∣u;pk(k−∣u);∅;{nz,a∣⋅,nz,b∣⋅}) (2)
Figure 15: Formalisation of smart certificates: initial knowledge and trace
6.3.1 Smart Certificates
Figure 15 displays our formalisation of smart certificates (§5.3.1). In addition to the
knowledge from Figure 14, Alice initially knows her public key certificate
MSk−∣⋅ca(i∣⋅al ,pk(k−∣⋅u),nc∣⋅⋅)
(nc∣⋅⋅ represents additional information in the certificate such as the validity date), and
the corresponding private key k−∣⋅al . The other items of initial knowledge are the contri-
butions nz,∗∣∗⋅ to Alice’s proof of knowledge of k−∣⋅al , and additional information na∣pi⋅ ,
nb∣η⋅ put in the attribute certificates issued by ii and is.
The messages in the traces Reg1 and Reg2 correspond to those in Figure 10(a); the
messages in the trace ServProv correspond to those in Figure 10(b). We model the
proof that Alice knows the secret key corresponding to her public key as a ZK proof
with secret information k−∣piu and public information pk(k−∣piu ).
6.3.2 Linking Service Model
Figure 16 displays the formalisation of the linking service model (§5.3.2). This sys-
tem introduces the linking service ls as an additional actor: it has an address and a
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C0ii = (Fig.14)∪{ip∣⋅ls,pk(k−∣⋅ls), i∣⋅ls,
i∣⋅is, ii1,ls∣piu ,n∣pi⋅ , iii∣ζu , isess∣ζu ,n∣ζ⋅ , iii∣ξu , isess∣ξu ,n∣ξ⋅ };C0is = (Fig.14)∪{ip∣⋅ls,pk(k−∣⋅ls), i∣⋅ls, i∣⋅is, ii2,ls∣ηu ,n∣η⋅ };C0bs = (Fig.14)∪{ip∣⋅ls,pk(k−∣⋅ls), i∣⋅ls, i∣⋅is};C0ls = (Fig.14)∪{ip∣⋅ls,pk(k−∣⋅ls),k−∣⋅ls, i∣⋅ls, i∣⋅is, il ∣νal , il ∣piu , il ∣ηu ,n′∣ζ⋅ ,n′∣ξ⋅ }
Scenario ∶= Reg1∣pi ; Reg2∣η ; ServProv∣ζ ; ServProv∣ξ
Reg1 ∶=
ip∣id p1 → ip∣ls ∶MSk−∣id p(ii1,ls∣u,n∣⋅) (1)
Reg2 ∶=
ip∣id p2 → ip∣ls ∶MSk−∣id p(ii2,ls∣u,n∣⋅) (2)
ServProv ∶=
ip∣id p1 → ip∣sp ∶MSk−∣id p1(isess∣u,d1∣u,d2∣u, i∣ls,
Epk(k−∣ls)(ii1,ls∣u,n∣⋅)) (1)
ip∣sp → ip∣ls ∶ Epk(k−∣ls)(ii1,ls∣u,n∣⋅),MSk−∣id p1(isess∣u,
d1∣u,d2∣u, i∣ls,Epk(k−∣ls)(ii1,ls∣u,n∣⋅)); (2)
ip∣ls → ip∣sp ∶ i∣id p2,Epk(k−∣id p2)(ii2,ls∣u,n′∣⋅); (3)
ip∣sp → ip∣id p2 ∶ Epk(k−∣id p2)(ii2,ls∣u,n′∣⋅),MSk−∣id p1(isess∣u,
d1∣u,d2∣u, i∣ls,Epk(k−∣ls)(ii1,ls∣u,n∣⋅)); (4)
ip∣id p2 → ip∣sp ∶MSk−∣id p2(isess∣u,d6∣u) (5)
Figure 16: Formalisation of linking service model: initial knowledge and trace
private/public key pair. ls and is have publicly known identifiers i∣⋅ls, i∣⋅is used in the
referrals. The user database of ls, modelled by domain ν , contains an entry for the user
containing only the identifier il ∣νal . User authentication to ls during registration is mod-
elled by ls’s knowledge of il ∣piu ; the pseudonyms generated by the identity providers are
modelled as ii1,ls∣piu and ii2,ls∣piu . Alice’s authentication at ii during service provision is
modelled by the fact that ii knows the identifiers iii∣∗u , ∗ ∈ {ζ ,ξ}.
The registration and service provision phases in the trace correspond to Figures 11(a)
and 11(b), respectively. To prove authenticity, the identity providers sign information
for bs using their private key. bs forwards the authentication assertion from ii to ls and
is to prove that the user has authenticated. The referrals by ii and is include random
nonces n∣⋅, n′∣⋅ to ensure that bs cannot link different sessions by comparing them.
The linking service model aims to satisfy a privacy requirement specifically about
the linking service, which we call LS attribute undetectability (LD). We can express
this requirement formally in a similar way to the SID, SPD, and ID requirements:
d1∣∗∗ ∉Ols∧ ...∧d6∣∗∗ ∉Ols.
The linking service model in general is independent from message formats. How-
ever, the authors also present an instantiation using the SAML 2.0 [30] and Liberty
ID-WSF 2.0 [54] standards. Our model captures that instantiation.
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6.3.3 Identity Mixer
C0al = (Fig.14)∪{i∣⋅al ,
nc1,1∣pi⋅ ,nc1,2∣pi⋅ ,nc1,3∣pi⋅ ,nc1,7∣pi⋅ ,nc2,1∣η⋅ ,nc2,2∣η⋅ ,nc2,3∣η⋅ ,nc2,7∣η⋅ ,
nv∣ζ⋅ ,cnd∣ζ⋅ ,n∣ζ⋅ ,n1,1∣ζ⋅ ,n1,2∣ζ⋅ ,n1,3∣ζ⋅ ,n1,a∣ζ⋅ ,n2,1∣ζ⋅ ,n2,a∣ζ⋅ ,
nv∣ξ⋅ ,cnd∣ξ⋅ ,n∣ξ⋅ ,n1,1∣ξ⋅ ,n1,2∣ξ⋅ ,n1,3∣ξ⋅ ,n1,a∣ξ⋅ ,n2,1∣ξ⋅ ,n2,a∣ξ⋅ }C0ii = (Fig.14)∪{nc1,4∣pi⋅ ,nc1,5∣pi⋅ ,nc1,6∣pi⋅ };C0is = (Fig.14)∪{nc2,4∣η⋅ ,nc2,5∣η⋅ ,nc2,6∣η⋅ };C0bs = (Fig.14)∪{n1,b∣ζ⋅ ,n2,b∣ζ⋅ ,n1,b∣ξ⋅ ,n2,b∣ξ⋅ }
Scenario ∶= Reg1∣pi ; Reg2∣η ; ServProv∣ζ ; ServProv∣ξ
Reg1 ∶=
ip∣u → ip∣id p1 ∶H(i∣u,nc1,1∣⋅); (1)
ip∣u ↦ ip∣id p1 ∶ ICredi∣uk−∣id p1(iii∣u,d1∣u,d2∣u,d3∣u;{nc1,i∣⋅}7i=1) (2)
Reg2 ∶=
ip∣u → ip∣id p2 ∶H(i∣u,nc2,1∣⋅); (3)
ip∣u ↦ ip∣id p2 ∶ ICredi∣uk−∣id p2(d5∣u,d6∣u;{nc2,i∣⋅}7i=1) (4)
ServProv ∶=
ip∣u → ip∣sp ∶H(i∣u,n∣⋅),H(iii∣u,n1,2∣⋅),H(d2∣u,n1,1∣⋅), (1)
ip∣u → ip∣sp ∶H(d3∣u,n1,3∣⋅),d1∣u,d2>60∣u,cnd∣⋅,
ip∣u → ip∣sp ∶ pk(k−∣tt p),Epk(k−∣tt p)(iii∣u,nv∣⋅)cnd∣⋅ ;
ip∣u ↦ ip∣sp ∶ ZK(credi∣uk−∣id p1(iii∣u,d1∣u,d2∣u,d3∣u;nc1,2∣⋅, (2)
ip∣u ↦ ip∣sp ∶ ZK(nc1,5∣⋅), i∣u, iii∣u,d1∣u,d2∣u,d3∣u,n∣⋅,n1,2∣⋅,
ip∣u ↦ ip∣sp ∶ ZK(n1,1∣⋅,n1,3∣⋅;H(i∣u,n∣⋅),H(iii∣u,n1,2∣⋅),
ip∣u ↦ ip∣sp ∶ ZK(H(d2∣u,n1,1∣⋅),H(d3∣u,n1,3∣⋅),d1∣u,
ip∣u ↦ ip∣sp ∶ ZK(pk(k−∣id p1),pk(k−∣tt p),Epk(k−∣tt p)(iii∣u,
ip∣u ↦ ip∣sp ∶ ZK(nv∣⋅)cnd∣⋅ ;d2>60∣u;{n1,a∣⋅,n1,b∣⋅});
ip∣u → ip∣sp ∶H(i∣u,n∣⋅),H(d5∣u,n2,1∣⋅),d6∣u,cnd∣⋅; (3)
ip∣u ↦ ip∣sp ∶ ZK(credi∣uk−∣id p2(d5∣u,d6∣u;nc2,2∣⋅,nc2,5∣⋅), i∣u, (4)
ip∣u ↦ ip∣sp ∶ ZK(d5∣u,d6∣u,n∣⋅,n2,1∣⋅;H(i∣u,n∣⋅),
ip∣u ↦ ip∣sp ∶ ZK(H(d5∣u,n2,1∣⋅),d6∣u,pk(k−∣id p2);
ip∣u ↦ ip∣sp ∶ ZK(∅;{n2,a∣⋅,n2,b∣⋅})
Figure 17: Formalisation of Identity Mixer: initial knowledge and trace
The formalisation of the scenario when using Identity Mixer (§5.3.3) is shown in
Figure 17. The most notable piece of initial knowledge is Alice’s secret identifier
i∣⋅al . In the trace, registration follows the steps of Figure 12(a); service provision is
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as in Figure 12(b). For our purposes, we can represent the commitment to Alice’s
secret identifier in the first message by a hashH(i∣piu ,nc1,1∣pi⋅ ). By inference rule (⊢EI2),
Alice learns a credential from the issuing protocol linking her attributes to her secret
identifier. For instance, from message (2) she can derive
credi∣uk−∣id p1(iii∣u,d1∣u,d2∣u,d3∣u;nc1,2∣⋅,nc1,5∣⋅,nc1,6∣⋅)∣pi .
Note that this credential contains Alice’s identifier iii∣piu as an additional attribute: it is
used later for anonymity revocation.
In the first message of service provision, again we represent the commitments to
Alice’s secret identifier and attributes by hashes. For anonymity revocation purposes,
the first message additionally includes an encryption of the identifier iii∣piu for the trusted
third party, with a condition cnd∣⋅ attached describing when the anonymity of the trans-
action may be revoked. The ZK proof in message (2) convinces bs that:
• Alice owns a credential, signed with ii’s private key;
• the secret identifier and attributes in the credential correspond to the values or
commitments sent previously;
• the property d2>60∣u is satisfied;
• the encrypted message sent previously is encrypted using pk(k−∣tt p) and contains
the identifier in the credential.
The second ZK proof is similar. Note that the commitment H(i∣u,n∣⋅) in messages (1)
and (3) is the same, guaranteeing bs that the two certificates are indeed of the same
user.
6.3.4 Smartcard Scheme
The Smartcard scheme (§5.3.4) is formalised in Figure 18. In this system, the user’s
personal information is exchanged on her behalf by a tamper-resistant smartcard. The
smartcard is modelled as actor al. The smartcard has a certified private key; however,
this private key is shared between different smartcards so it does not identify the user.
Instead, the smartcard has a secret user identifier i∣⋅al , generated on the card, which is
used to generate pseudonyms. The actors ii, is, and bs each have a private key and a
corresponding public key certificate signed by the certification authority.
The messages from the registration part of the trace correspond to Figure 13(a); the
messages from the service provision part correspond to Figure 13(b). Parties derive a
shared session key using authenticated key agreement based on public key certificates
and exchanged randomness. The smartcard generates pseudonyms of Alice with re-
spect to the two identity providers using hashes. In the service provision phase, q∣⋅ and
dm∣⋅ represent bs’s query: what information it needs, and how recent it should be.
Note that in [100], the exact format of the encrypted message to the trusted third
party for anonymity revocation is not specified. We chose an encryption of the user’s
identifier at the address provider because this is most appropriate for our scenario.
Also, it is not specified how attributes are sent to the smartcard for caching; we chose
to add one additional message to the registration phase containing all attributes.
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C0al = Csal ∪{pk(k−∣⋅ca),MSk−∣⋅ca(ic∣⋅⋅,pk(k−c ∣⋅⋅),nc∣⋅⋅),k−c ∣⋅⋅, i∣⋅al ,
na∣pi⋅ ,na∣η⋅ ,nv∣ζ⋅ , isess∣ζu ,na∣ζ⋅ ,nv∣ξ⋅ , isess∣ξu ,na∣ξ⋅ };C0ii = Csii∪{pk(k−∣⋅ca),MSk−∣⋅ca(i∣⋅ii,pk(k−∣⋅ii),nii∣⋅⋅),nb∣pi⋅ };C0is = Csis∪{pk(k−∣⋅ca),MSk−∣⋅ca(i∣⋅is,pk(k−∣⋅is),nis∣⋅⋅),nb∣η⋅ };C0bs = Csbs∪{pk(k−∣⋅ca),MSk−∣⋅ca(i∣⋅bs,pk(k−∣⋅bs),nbs∣⋅⋅),
nb∣ζ⋅ ,dm∣ζ⋅ ,q∣ζ⋅ ,nb∣ξ⋅ ,dm∣ξ⋅ ,q∣ξ⋅ }
Scenario ∶= Reg1∣pi ; Reg2∣η ; ServProv∣ζ ; ServProv∣ξ
Reg1 ∶=
ip∣u → ip∣id p1 ∶MSk−∣ca(ic∣⋅,pk(k−c ∣⋅),nc∣⋅),na∣⋅; (1)
ip∣id p1 → ip∣u ∶MSk−∣ca(i∣id p1,pk(k−∣id p1),nid p1∣⋅),nb∣⋅; (2)
ip∣u → ip∣id p1 ∶ E′AKA(k−c ∣⋅;na∣⋅;k−∣id p1;nb∣⋅)(H(i∣u, i∣id p1)); (3)
ip∣id p1 → ip∣u ∶ E′AKA(k−c ∣⋅;na∣⋅;k−∣id p1;nb∣⋅)(d1∣u,d2∣u,d3∣u) (4)
Reg2 ∶=
ip∣u → ip∣id p2 ∶MSk−∣ca(ic∣⋅,pk(k−c ∣⋅),nc∣⋅),na∣⋅; (5)
ip∣id p2 → ip∣u ∶MSk−∣ca(i∣id p2,pk(k−∣id p2),nid p2∣⋅),nb∣⋅; (6)
ip∣u → ip∣id p2 ∶ E′AKA(k−c ∣⋅;na∣⋅;k−∣id p2;nb∣⋅)(H(i∣u, i∣id p2)); (7)
ip∣id p2 → ip∣u ∶ E′AKA(k−c ∣⋅;na∣⋅;k−∣id p2;nb∣⋅)(d5∣u,d6∣u) (8)
ServProv ∶=
ip∣u → ip∣sp ∶MSk−∣ca(ic∣⋅,pk(k−c ∣⋅),nc∣⋅),na∣⋅; (1)
ip∣sp → ip∣u ∶MSk−∣ca(i∣sp,pk(k−∣sp),nsp∣⋅),nb∣⋅; (2)
ip∣u → ip∣sp ∶ E′AKA(k−c ∣⋅;na∣⋅;k−∣sp;nb∣⋅)(isess∣u); (3)
ip∣sp → ip∣u ∶ isess∣u,E′AKA(k−c ∣⋅;na∣⋅;k−∣sp;nb∣⋅)(dm∣⋅); (4)
ip∣sp → ip∣u ∶ isess∣u,E′AKA(k−c ∣⋅;na∣⋅;k−∣sp;nb∣⋅)(q∣⋅); (5)
ip∣u → ip∣sp ∶ E′AKA(k−c ∣⋅;na∣⋅;k−∣sp;nb∣⋅)(d1∣u,d2>60∣u,d6∣u,
ip∣u → ip∣sp ∶ Epk(k−∣tt p)(H(i∣u, i∣id p1),nv∣⋅)) (6)
Figure 18: Formalisation of Smartcard scheme: initial knowledge and trace
6.4 Step 4: Verify Privacy Properties & Analysis of Results
Step 4 of our framework is to verify which requirements are satisfied by the analysed
systems. This step is performed automatically using our Prolog tool (§3.3): given the
formalised requirements (§6.2) and communication in the systems (§6.3), the tool au-
tomatically determines which requirements hold in which systems. (More precisely, it
computes the state that the given initial state evolves into by the given trace, also check-
ing trace validity (see Appendix A); then computes the views of actors and coalitions
in this state; and finally, verifies which of the given requirements hold in these views.)
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Scheme AX AR SID SPD ID IM ISM SL IL IIL ISL
Smart certificates
Linking service model
Identity Mixer †
Smartcard scheme
Table 5: Comparison of privacy requirements claimed and satisfied by the various sys-
tems. Filled check-mark: satisfied and claimed; empty check-mark: satisfied and not
claimed; filled cross: not satisfied and claimed; empty cross: not satisfied and not
claimed (see Table 3) . †: may not be satisfiable efficiently depending on non-privacy-
related requirements.
The results are shown in Table 5: we now analyse them.
6.4.1 Non-privacy requirements
The two non-privacy requirements attribute exchange (AX) and anonymity revocation
(AR) are satisfied in all systems. Indeed, attribute exchange is the basic requirement
of an IdM system. It is worth noting the relationship between AR and ISL. In smart
certificates and the linking service model, ISL does not hold. In this case, AR holds
automatically because the service provider and identity providers can link service ac-
cesses to user profiles (even without the help of the trusted third party). In the two
systems satisfying ISL (the Identity Mixer and Smartcard systems), the transmission of
an identifier encrypted for the trusted third party is necessary to fulfil this requirement.
6.4.2 Detectability requirements
The detectability requirements with respect to the service provider, property-attribute
undetectability (SPD) and irrelevant attribute undetectability (SID), verify the possi-
bility to reveal properties of attributes without revealing the exact value; and to reveal
some but not all attributes. In smart certificates, the complete certificate is transmit-
ted, so it satisfies neither requirement. To address SID, the identity provider could
issue a separate credential for each user attribute. To partially address SPD, the iden-
tity provider could issue several credentials proving common properties of attributes,
e.g. an “age > 60” credential. These latter credentials could be obtained during the
service provision phase, in effect transforming smart certificates into a relationship-
focused system. Indeed, this variant is discussed in [77]. Another possibility is to use
certificates that allow efficient proofs of knowledge, as in the Identity Mixer system.
In the linking service model, SPD does not hold. Actually, the linking service
model focuses primarily on involvement and linkability issues, leaving the details of
the actual attribute exchange to underlying standards. However, in these standards (in
particular, SAML) it is not possible to exchange properties of an attribute instead of its
value. Recently, an extension to SAML to achieve this has been proposed [73]. With
this extension (or other instantiations), the requirement may hold.
IdP attribute undetectability (ID) and LS attribute undetectability (LD) also do not
hold in the linking service model. This is because the linking service and the subscrip-
tion provider both receive the signed authentication assertion from the address provider
as guarantee that the user has logged in. However, in the SAML standard, the attributes
are part of this signed message, so they also need to be forwarded. Technically, this
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could be easily solved by signing the attributes separately from the authentication infor-
mation. Again, this problem is due to the instantiation of the model with SAML. Note
that although ID is not explicitly claimed by the other IdM systems, they do satisfy it.
6.4.3 Involvement requirements
The involvement requirements state that an identity provider should not know about the
user’s involvement with other identity providers (mutual IdP involvement undetectabil-
ity, IM) or service providers (IdP-SP involvement undetectability, ISM). In credential-
focused systems, this is natural: the identity provider issues a credential to the user
without involving others, and it is not involved in service provisions. Indeed, smart
certificates, Identity Mixer and the Smartcard scheme all satisfy IM and ISM.
In the linking service model, ISM does not hold because there is direct commu-
nication between the identity providers and the service provider. In a variant of the
model [31], the identity providers and service provider communicate indirectly via
the linking service. However, here the identity providers encrypt the attributes for the
service provider (to preserve privacy with respect to the linking service), and so still
need to know its identity. To prevent this, some kind of trusted intermediary (like the
smartcard in the Smartcard scheme) seems to be necessary.
Moreover, the linking service model does not satisfy IM. The subscription provider
learns from the authentication assertion that the user has an account at the address
provider (but not the other way round). This problem is also mentioned in [31]: while
“multiple [identity providers] must give [a service provider] the aggregated set of at-
tributes without knowing about one another’s involvement”, the authors concede that
“linked [identity providers] may become aware of just one other [identity provider] –
the authenticating [identity provider] – during service provision”. IM can be satisfied
(within the standards used) if the subscription provider trusts the linking service to
verify the address provider’s signature. Another possibility to satisfy the requirement
may be to use group signatures [33] for the authentication assertion from the address
provider. This solution prevents the subscription provider from learning at which iden-
tity provider the user authenticated, but at the cost of reduced accountability.
6.4.4 Linkability requirements
Finally, we discuss the results for the linkability requirements. Session unlinkability
(SL) is a natural requirement for relationship-focused systems, because the identity
provider generates a new signature over the attributes at every service provision. In-
deed, it holds for the linking service model. It also holds for the credential-focused
Identity Mixer system because rather than showing the credential (which would allow
linking), the user just proves the validity of properties using ZK proofs. In the Smart-
card scheme, the smartcard is trusted to correctly send attributes from the credentials it
knows. In the smart certificates scheme, however, the complete credential is shown so
the requirement is not satisfied. IdP service access unlinkability (IL), in contrast, is nat-
ural if the identity provider is not involved in service provision, i.e., for the credential-
focused smart certificates, Identity Mixer, and Smartcard schemes. It is less natural for
relationship-focused systems such as the linking service model. In this case, private
information retrieval [35] can be used so that at least the non-authenticating identity
provider does not learn which user he is providing attributes of.
To achieve IdP profile unlinkability (IIL), global identifiers should be avoided in
credential-focused as well as relationship-focused systems. Smart certificates, being
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based on the user’s public key certificate, do not satisfy this requirement. In Identity
Mixer, IIL holds because the identity providers do not learn the identifiers of the cre-
dentials they issue. In the Smartcard scheme, it holds because each identity provider
learns a different identifier based on a secret known only by the smartcard. In the link-
ing service model, the authenticating identity provider generates a session identifier
and includes it in the authentication assertion sent to the other identity provider. This
forwarding of the assertion can be avoided if identity providers trust the linking ser-
vice to verify the authentication assertion: identity providers can then issue attributes
under different session identifiers, and the linking service can assert the link between
them. However, this only partially solves the problem: identity providers are still both
involved in service provision, so they may link using timing information. Indeed, just
eliminating global identifiers does not fix IIL in our model.
IdP-SP unlinkability (ISL) does not hold for the same two systems that also do not
satisfy IIL, and for similar reasons. In smart certificates, all parties learn the user’s
public key certificate; in the linking service model, the service provider learns the
session identifier from the authenticating identity provider. The other systems satisfy
it: in Identity Mixer, not even the issuer of the credential can recognise a ZK proof
about it; in the Smartcard scheme, the smartcard ensures that the information flow
between identity providers and service providers is restricted to just the attributes.
However, as a consequence of ISL holding, extra work is needed to achieve ac-
countability in two respects. First, a message encrypted to a trusted third party is
provided to the service provider to achieve anonymity revocation. Second, although
service providers do not learn a credential identifier, they do need assurance that the
credential has not been revoked. In the Smartcard scheme, the suggested solution is to
let the smartcard perform a regular revocation check. Similarly, in the Identity Mixer
system, credentials can be given a short lifetime and be checked for revocation at re-
issuing [23]. In both cases, revocation is not immediate.
For Identity Mixer, two proposals for immediate revocation have been done [27].
The first proposal is to include a serial number in the credential. The credential can
be issued so that either the identity provider learns this serial number or not. The
former case makes ISL not satisfied. In the latter case, ISL holds but the credential
cannot be revoked if the user loses her serial number or does not wish to participate.
Depending on the situation at hand, this latter behaviour may not be acceptable. The
second proposal is to use a ZK proof that the credential is on a public list of valid
credentials [23]. This allows revocation without the user’s help while not breaking
ISL; however, the user needs to keep track of all revoked credentials in the system,
and despite recent advances [23] this may still not be efficient enough. Note that the
Smartcard scheme does not support immediate revocation at all.
7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss several applicability aspects of our analysis framework:
what privacy requirements can be verified, how the scenario should be defined, and
what systems can be modelled. We also discuss possible generalisations, and effort
needed to analyse a new system.
Privacy Requirements Our framework can be used to verify any data minimisa-
tion requirement expressible in terms of the elementary detectability, linkability, and
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involvement requirements described in Section 2.3. Although the case study demon-
strates that this includes many relevant requirements proposed in the literature, there
are also privacy aspects that our model does not capture. Most significantly, we allow
only limited reasoning (via attribute properties) about the meaning of pieces of personal
information other than identifiers. For instance, we do not allow a piece of informa-
tion to be inferred from several others, e.g. “address” follows from “street name” and
“house number”. Also, we do not consider (probabilistic) links due to combinations
of non-identifying attributes, e.g., matching name and post code from two profiles im-
ply a link with high probability. This choice reflects the goal of our approach, namely
to compare the relative privacy of different systems (that differ in what identifiers are
used and how). On the other hand, to obtain a full understanding of the privacy of users
that does take such inferences into account, our approach can be complemented with
orthogonal (e.g., probabilistic) methods (see Section 8).
Apart from explicitly transferred information, i.e., the user’s attributes, we analyse
one particular kind of implicitly transferred information; namely, involvement require-
ments. However, other kinds may be of interest as well. For instance, the number of
transactions performed by a user may be privacy-sensitive, as may be the mere date
and time of certain activities (see, e.g., privacy issues in smart metering systems [82]).
Knowledge about numbers of transactions can be expressed in our model; date and
time may be appended as “tags” to communication.
Scenario-Dependence Our analysis framework requires the specification of a sce-
nario. In particular, this scenario needs to be designed in such a way that all privacy
properties to be verified can be phrased in terms of personal information occuring in
the scenario. It is straightforward to analyse variants of the scenario by modifying it,
but this does involve some work in practice. Our analysis framework and its imple-
mentation are designed to verify properties of particular elements in a particular trace;
both need to be modified for other scenarios. This task can be lightened by exploiting
Prolog’s programming features. For instance, the scenario in our case study involves
two traces of service provisions, which are almost the same; in our implementation of
the model of the systems, both are generated by one Prolog predicate which takes the
variable elements as input. This approach can also be used to generate traces with more
actors or protocols, and to generate lists of checks that need to be performed for a given
privacy requirement. Since the conclusions of an analysis depend on the scenario, it
should be chosen carefully to capture all relevant privacy aspects. We refer to [98] for a
symbolic extension of our framework which is independent from a particular scenario.
Adaptation and Generalisation Our framework is designed to be general enough
for the analysis of any system in which actors use communication protocols to ex-
change personal information. If the message format of the communication protocols in
the system is available, then the main difficulty in modelling the system is to make sure
the cryptographic primitives used in the protocols are accurately modelled. Although
the present work models several frequently-used primitives, the model may need to be
adapted to reflect characteristics of the particular implementations used (e.g., digital
signatures may be with message recovery instead of with appendix, meaning that the
message can be derived from the signature [69]); or new cryptographic primitives may
need to be added. Once this is done, modelling the actual protocols is usually a matter
of industrious bookkeeping.
To give the reader a flavour of the effort needed to model new primitives, we draw
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upon our experiences in extending the basic formal model of [99] to perform the case
study in this paper. Some operations are easily expressible in terms of standard primi-
tives. For instance, for our purposes, commitments can be modelled as hashes because
they satisfy the same inference rules. When modelling primitives, it is helpful to look
at existing formalisations, e.g. using deductive systems [37, 49] or equational theo-
ries [2, 16]: they can usually be translated to the three-layer model. For instance, the
formalisation of labelled encryption used in this work is based on [26]. Special atten-
tion should be paid to testing rules. Deductive systems do not usually consider testing;
equational theories can include rules, e.g., for signature verification (e.g., [43]), which
translate to testing rules in the three-layer model, but may include only those rules
that were relevant to the analysis at hand. Thus, to obtain a complete set of testing
rules, one needs to take a lower-level look at the operation of the primitive. In addition,
note that existing formalisations (e.g., [26]) may not explicitly model randomness in
non-deterministic primitives; however, in our model this is needed because we assume
messages to be deterministic.
In some cases, no suitable existing formalisation of a cryptographic primitive may
be available. In such a case, the general (security) definition of the primitive (e.g., [41]
for ZK proofs) generally suffices for obtaining a description for the language Lc. How-
ever, different implementations of a primitive may give rise to different inference rules.
Thus, to obtain inference rules, one needs to consider the particular implementation
used in the protocol under analysis. In our experience, this is feasible. Note that be-
cause we are only interested in privacy aspects of the primitives, usually some simpli-
fications can be made. See Appendix B for two examples: ZK proofs and anonymous
credentials.
As mentioned in Section 3, our model imposes several assumptions on the cryp-
tographic primitives and operations modelled. In particular, because we assume that
differently-constructed messages cannot have coinciding contents, we cannot model
some operations such as “exclusive or” (which satisfies that x⊕(x⊕y) = y). Also, our
visible failure assumption may cause an over-approximation the knowledge of actors:
in our model, actors can draw conclusions from the fact that a cryptographic operation
was applied successfully, in practice, this may not be possible. These limitations may
be overcome by generalising our model through its connection with static equivalence
(see Section 8); we leave this as future work.
8 Related Work
We discuss related work on our privacy analysis framework (§8.1), and on the identity
management case study (§8.2).
8.1 Privacy Analysis Framework
The analysis of privacy entails two orthogonal concerns: what information is leaked
by how identifiers and other pieces of information are exchanged in communication
protocols; and what inferences can be made from the information learned in this way.
The present work addresses the former concern, which we discuss first; afterwards, we
briefly discuss the latter concern.
Formal analysis techniques have been applied to communication protocols for many
years, mainly to verify security properties [2, 22, 68, 78]. Most formal methods rely
on two basic ideas: the Dolev-Yao attacker model and state exploration techniques.
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In the Dolev-Yao attacker model, one considers communication messages using ide-
alised cryptographic primitives, and an attacker who controls some or all communi-
cation channels between legitimate parties (meaning that he can insert and suppress
messages at will, and fabricate messages based on his observations). The reasoning
that the attacker performs to fabricate messages can be described by deductive systems
(e.g., [37, 49]) or equational theories (e.g., [2, 16]). State space exploration techniques
assess the system security by analysing all possible evolutions of a given system in the
presence of a Dolev-Yao attacker. The requirements of a system are then verified by
checking whether any of the states that can be reached by the system correspond to an
attack (e.g., the attacker knows a secret, or has succeeded in impersonating a legitimate
user). Several process algebras [2, 19, 70] provide machinery to perform state space
exploration. Other approaches have also been proposed, e.g., using induction [78].
Recently, more and more work has focused on the use of these techniques for
privacy properties, in application domains such as electronic toll collection [42], e-
voting [43, 45], RFID systems [21], and Direct Anonymous Attestation [88]. These
proposals express privacy in terms of “experiments”: slightly different settings for the
execution of the same protocol that should be indistinguishable to an attacker. For
instance, in electronic toll collection, an attacker should not be able to distinguish a
setting in which a first car takes a left road and a second car takes a right road from a
situation in which the first car takes the right road and the second car takes the left road.
Similarly, in Direct Anonymous Attestation, an attacker should not be able to distin-
guish a signature produced by one trusted platform module from a signature produced
by another one.
Conceptually, our work differs from these existing formal methods in several ways.
We provide general definitions for detectability and associability that take into account
different data subjects that may occur in a single protocol instance; conversely, ex-
isting works either provide specific definitions tailored to a particular setting or pro-
tocol [42, 43, 45], or only consider links between messages and their senders [5].
Moreover, we explicitly model the knowledge of (coalitions of) legitimate actors in
the system as needed for analysis of data minimisation, whereas existing methods fo-
cus on (malicious) outsiders. Also, we consider knowledge in a particular scenario,
whereas existing methods focus on a family of scenarios. Although particular queries
in our analysis framework could be translated to queries using these existing formal
methods (e.g., using frameworks like [34] to convert a trace to a set of actions by pro-
tocol roles), we expect that it is infeasible to design a completely automatic translation
to queries that the tools available today are able to handle. Conversely, our privacy
analysis framework achieves practical privacy analysis and comes with an implemen-
tation.
At a technical level, however, there are similarities between our model for reasoning
about knowledge and existing models. Existing models reason about knowledge of an
attacker about message contents. Three popular definitions cover whether an attacker
knows the contents of a given piece of information: weak secrecy [15], resistance
against guessing attacks [39], and strong secrecy [15]. The weakest definition, weak
secrecy, defines secrecy as non-derivability using a contents-layer deductive system;
as shown in [99], this property holds exactly if no context-layer representation of the
contents can be derived using our three-layer model.
The other two existing definitions strengthen the concept of weak secrecy by em-
ploying the notion of static equivalence [2] of frames. A frame captures the knowledge
of an actor at a certain point in time. Intuitively, two frames are statically equivalent if
an actor cannot distinguish between the situations modelled by the two frames. Resis-
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tance against guessing attacks [39] of a frame models that an actor should not have any
way to verify if a guess he makes about the contents of a particular piece of information
is correct. This is formalised by adding the actor’s guess to the frame, and verifying
that the situation in which the guess is correct is statically equivalent to the situation in
which the guess is incorrect. Intuitively, in our model, the contents c of a piece of infor-
mation is resistant to guessing attacks if and only if there is no context-layer item with
contents c that is known to be content equivalent to a guess with contents c. This link
can be made more precise, and can be used to generalise the approach presented in this
paper (see [95] for details). One strong point of static equivalence is that it can be for-
mally linked to computational models of cryptography [9]; compared to the equational
theory of [9], our visible failure assumption on deterministic symmetric encryption is
an over-approximation of knowledge.
Strong secrecy [15] additionally takes into account that the secret may have the
same contents as any arbitrary other message, as well as that the value of the secret
may influence the behaviour of actors. Our model (as well as the definition of resistance
against guessing attacks) does not take these aspects into account, so strong secrecy is,
formally speaking, stronger. Strong and weak secrecy are known to coincide [40] under
certain conditions in a certain equational theory; an interesting direction for future
work is to verify if similar results hold for the equational theories corresponding to
our model. We remark that in practice, tools verify an over-approximation of strong
secrecy [16] and hence may give false positives.
Similarly, existing notions of linkability [5, 42, 43, 45] are formally based on static
equivalences. For instance, in the electronic toll collection example given above, con-
sider any frame corresponding to a system evolution in which a first car with identifier
A goes left and a second car with identifier B goes right. Unlinkability means that this
frame should be statically equivalent to a frame corresponding to a system evolution
when the first car has identifier B and the second car has identifier A. In many cases,
corresponding frames differ only by the use of identifiers, in which case static equiva-
lence corresponds to the non-knowledge of content equivalence of these identifiers, like
our definition of associability. However, linkability also allows other correspondences
and takes into account that the value of the identifier may influence the behaviour of
actors, and is thus, formally speaking, more powerful. Also in this case, existing tools
over-approximate linkability [16]; in practice, it is difficult to avoid false positives.
There are also technical similarities between our model of particular cryptographic
primitives and other models from the literature. Labelled encryption is a straightfor-
ward extension of normal encryption; our model is similar to the one in [26]. The
internals of (incorrect) protocols for authenticated key agreement have over the years
proven a popular target for analysis using formal methods [22, 66, 78]; however, we
have not found prior works that formally model the external behaviour of (correct)
authenticated key exchange protocols in a larger system.
For ZK proofs, both high-level and low-level formalisations exist. In [65], a low-
level model of the operation of ZK proofs is given; however, it cannot be used for
knowledge derivation; also, questions have been raised about its technical correctness
[26]. Two high-level formalisations of ZK proofs have been proposed [7, 26] that,
as ours, allow proofs of a restricted set of properties. The equational theory in [7]
models the verification of ZK proofs (as our testing rules); the model of [26] only
allows correct ZK proofs to take place and does not express their verification. The
latter simplification is not suitable for our method, because verification expresses that
an actor learns information in new contexts. Note that both model “signature proofs of
knowledge” rather than Σ-proofs; however, our methods can also capture that variant.
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Three recent proposals [26, 65, 88] are relevant for our formal model of anony-
mous credentials. [65] only considers operational aspects of anonymous credentials.
[26] models credentials and their showing protocol. The model of credentials is similar
to ours, and it includes a rule to obtain a credential from a committed message as in our
low-level formalisation (Appendix B.2). The showing protocol is formalised in terms
of ZK proofs. However, credential issuing is not considered in [26]. Finally, Smyth
et al. [88] model joining and signing protocols for ECC-based Direct Anonymous At-
testation, which are very similar to issuing and showing protocols for BM-CL-based
anonymous credentials [25]. Although our model is based on a different signature
scheme [24] and specified at a higher level, their model of signatures generally corre-
sponds to our model of signatures from committed messages in Appendix B.2.
Apart from the concern of learning information leaked by communication proto-
cols, the orthogonal concern of inferences made on learned information has also re-
ceived substantial attention. In particular, the inference of links based on non-identifiers
has been approached from two directions: experimentally linking given data, or the-
oretically guaranteeing that such linking is impossible. Methods to link data from
two databases using non-identifiers have been investigated since the seminal paper of
Fellegi and Sunter [48]; see [60] for a recent comparative study of available implemen-
tations. Data from more than two sources can be grouped together based on pairwise
decisions using domain-dependent [13, 76, 71, 84] or domain-independent [14, 32] al-
gorithms, or statistical techniques [83]. On the other hands, statistical frameworks to
guarantee that linking personal information in a disclosure to other data is impossible
(i.e., anonymity) include k-anonymity [36], `-diversity [67], t-closeness [64] and dif-
ferential privacy [46]. Koot [59] reports on experiments in which the actual degree of
anonymity of particular disclosures is computed. Inferences of attribute values based
on other attributes is covered in [81]. Our approach can be complemented with these
techniques to obtain a full understanding of privacy leakage due to communication.
8.2 Privacy in Identity Management
The relevance of privacy by data minimisation in the identity management setting is
well-established in the literature. It has been recognised as a basic “law of identity”
for the design of IdM systems [28]. Hansen et al. [53] argue that privacy-enhancing
IdM systems should satisfy a high level of data minimisation with user-controlled link-
age of personal data, and by default unlinkability of different user actions. Pfitzmann
and Hansen [79] define privacy-enhancing identity management as preserving the un-
linkability between user profiles. Finally, in a general survey, Alpa´r et al. [3] identify
three main privacy issues in identity management: linkability across domains, identity
providers knowing user transactions, and violation of proportionality and subsidiar-
ity (i.e., the exchange of minimal information needed for a certain goal). These three
issues correspond to our three kinds of privacy requirements: linkability, involvement
and detectability, respectively. In contrast to the vision of minimising actor knowledge,
Landau and Moore argue that preventing service providers from collecting transaction
data may not be desirable because it prevents the adoption of IdM systems in practice
[62]. This falls into a broader discussion on incentives of participants in IdM systems
[4, 29] that is out of scope for this work.
This work aims to improve the way privacy by data minimisation is assessed com-
pared to existing comparisons [1, 55]. Both comparisons of IdM systems that we are
aware of consider data minimisation as one aspect of a much more general comparison
of IdM systems. Data minimisation requirements are specified in a high-level way, and
49
verified manually by inspecting the user interface and documentation of the systems.
For instance, [1] considers three different criteria: “usage of pseudonyms/anonymity”;
“usage of different pseudonyms” and “user [is] only asked for needed data” (judged on
a yes/no scale). [55] considers two: “directed identity”/“pseudonymous/anonymous
use” and “minimal disclosure” (judged on a ++ to -- scale). To improve the objectiv-
ity and accuracy of such assessments, scores for such criteria may instead be obtained
by aggregating formal analysis results like ours. To obtain a better understanding of
privacy differences, these formal results can then be analysed as in Section 6.4. How-
ever, note that our method can only be used to assess data minimisation requirements
given what information should be exchanged; to verify if this exchange of information
is really needed, or consented to by the user, other methods (e.g., [38]) should be used.
Some other aspects of the privacy assessment in [1, 55] seem less suitable for formal
verification, e.g. the user-friendliness and the use of standards in the systems.
Some formal works on privacy in identity management are available. In [79],
privacy-enhancing identity management is defined as preserving unlinkability between
different user profiles, and the meaning of linkability and its relationship with related
concepts is explored in a semi-formal way. Their informal definitions formed the basis
of our original work [96] on representing knowledge of personal information. Other
formal work on identity management has mainly focused on safety properties with re-
spect to misbehaving attackers, rather than privacy properties with respect to insiders
who follow the protocol specification. In this context, unlinkability [65, 91] and unde-
tectability [26] properties have been considered for Identity Mixer and related anony-
mous credential schemes. For SAML [30], a standard for the exchange of identity
information between identity and service providers used in the linking service model,
secrecy properties have been considered [6]. Our work differs from this latter category
in two respects: first, we define properties in a general setting, allowing comparisons
between different systems; and second, we distinguish between the roles of different
insiders rather than considering one outsider, enabling us to express which (coalitions
of) actors can associate or detect certain information, and which cannot.
In this work, we focus on minimising knowledge of personal information by tech-
nical means; other works address other aspects of privacy. Landau et al. [61] argue
that privacy protection can be achieved not just technically, but also by legal and policy
means. Hansen et al. [53] argue that apart from ensuring data minimisation, privacy-
enhancing IdM systems should also make the user aware of what information is ex-
changed about her and who can link it; and allow the user to control these aspects.
Bhargav-Spantzel et al. [12] stress the importance of trust between different parties in
identity management, and in particular, trust of the user in other parties’ handling of her
personal information. Our method can complement this demand for transparency by
providing a precise view on how the choice of IdM system impacts privacy. However,
interestingly, recent research in behavioural economics suggests that offering trans-
parency to users might actually reduce their privacy by inducing them to release more
information [20].
9 Conclusions & Future Work
In this work, we have presented a general formal framework to compare communi-
cation protocols with respect to privacy by data minimisation. Requirements relevant
in a given setting are formalised independently from any particular communication
protocol in terms of the knowledge of (coalitions of) actors in a three-layer model of
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personal information. These requirements are then verified automatically for particu-
lar protocols by computing this knowledge from a description of their communication.
Using this formal approach, we obtain results that are precise and verifiable, yet pro-
vide enough detail to obtain real insight into privacy differences. In contrast to existing
methods, our framework allows for the automated verification of a wide range of pri-
vacy requirements in one single model.
Our framework may be generalised and extended along several directions. First, the
model of personal information can be made more expressive. For instance, to analyse
privacy in application domains where the number and timing of transactions is rele-
vant, the model can be extended to take these aspects into account. Other relevant ex-
tensions include pieces of information that refer to multiple data subjects (see [98]); or
more flexible reasoning about attribute properties. Second, the model of cryptographic
primitives can be made more general. Our current model is based on two assumptions
(structural equivalence and visible failure) that limit the number of cryptographic prim-
itives that can be modelled. We are exploring how these limitations can be overcome
by modelling cryptographic primitives using an equational theory. Finally, our model
depends on the choice of a particular scenario in which requirements are verified; we
refer to [98] for a generalisation of our model that is independent from a particular
scenario.
We have demonstrated our framework by performing a privacy comparison of iden-
tity management systems. In the process, we have defined a comprehensive and de-
tailed set of privacy requirements; to the best of our knowledge, no such set of re-
quirements was available before. We have modelled 4 representative IdM systems, and
verified which of the 11 requirements hold for which systems, giving 44 checks in total.
It is worth noting that only 17 of the 44 checks are mentioned as (parts of) requirements
in the design of the respective IdM systems. In one instance, we found such a require-
ment not to hold (a problem which is also mentioned by the authors of the system
themselves). In another instance, we clarified the exact setting in which a requirement
holds, which may a solution that is unrealistic for performance or accountability rea-
sons. The remaining 27 of the 44 checks do not correspond to requirements explicitly
stated by the designers of the IdM systems. In this work, we have established whether
they hold or not, leading to a more comprehensive analysis and comparison of IdM
systems. Interesting extensions to the case study would be to consider requirements for
IdM systems based on the extensions mentioned above (e.g. requirements on knowl-
edge about the number of transactions); and additional IdM systems like U-Prove [75]
and the STORK Platform (https://www.eid-stork.eu/) as well as other variants
of the systems we considered.
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A Trace Validity
In this appendix, we introduce “trace validity” as a way of verifying that all knowledge
required for a trace has been modelled. Our framework takes as input a trace, together
with the initial knowledge of the actors. However, there are no guarantees that the
trace and initial knowledge provided by the analyst are correctly specified. This is
fundamental for the analysis, because the initial knowledge also determines whether
an actor can link the information he has observed to information he already has. The
concept of “trace validity” checks whether the initial knowledge and trace correspond
to a valid scenario (i.e., a scenario in that can actually occur), and hence serves as a
“sanity check” for the model.
To define trace validity, we need to model whether a context item has occurred
in communication before. When an actor a initiates a protocol instance pi in state{Cx}x∈A, no communication in the protocol instance has taken place yet, so the state
does not contain context items with domain pi . Hence, to check whether a can send
message m∣pi , we cannot just verify if Ca ⊢ m∣pi . Instead, we need to model that the
actor “instantiates” the context items in m∣pi by items from other domains. On the other
hand, if actor b wants to reply to message m∣pi , then he no longer has this freedom to
instantiate context items because contents of the context items from m∣pi he uses in his
reply should corresponds to their contents in m∣pi itself. In the former case, we call the
context items undetermined; in the latter case, we call them determined:
Definition 23. Let {Cx}x∈A be a state. We say that p ∈ Pc is determined in {Cx}x∈A
if, for some a ∈ A and m ∈ Ca, p occurs in m; or if p is a property ψi(q) of some q
occurring in m. Otherwise, p is undetermined.
We now formalise when an actor has sufficient knowledge in a certain state to send
a certain message m∣pi . The actor can instantiate any undetermined items in m∣pi , but
needs to respect the existing instantiation of determined items in m∣pi . We capture this
by requiring that the actor can derive a message n that is equal to m, except that undeter-
mined items are replaced by items of his choice. Intuitively, the actor having sufficient
knowledge to send m∣pi means that, when the message m is added to his knowledge
base, he does not gain any new knowledge from this. For instance, if the actor can as-
sociate personal information from message m∣pi to information in his knowledge base,
then he should be able to make the same associations using the corresponding item in
n. The restrictions on n in the definition below guarantee that this is indeed the case:
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Definition 24. Let {Cx}x∈A be a state, and a ∈ A an actor. Context message m is
determinable by a in {Cx}x∈A if there exists a context message n ≡m such that Ca ⊢ n,
and the following conditions hold:
1. Whenever m@z is determined, then m@z = n@z;
2. Whenever m@z1 =m@z2, then n@z1 = n@z2;
3. If m@z = d∣κk (k ≠ ⋅) and some e∣ηk ∈ Ic∪Dc is determined, then n@z↔a e∣ηk ;
4. If m@z1 = d∣κk , m@z2 = d′∣κk (k ≠ ⋅), and no e∣ηk ∈ Ic ∪Dc is determined, then
n@z1↔a n@z2.
Condition 1 states that the actor cannot replace determined items; condition 2 states
that he should replace items consistently. Conditions 3 and 4 make sure that actors can-
not learn new associations by using n as m: condition 3 applies to contexts already used
in previous communication, and condition 4 applies to previously unused contexts. For
determined messages, determinability and detectability coincide.
The following example demonstrates determinability:
Example 25. Consider the state {C0x}x∈A from Example 22. The client’s message
m = E′shkey∣⋅(id∣su)∣pi is determinable by cli in this state. Namely, take n = E′skey∣⋅⋅(id∣ab4 ).
Then m ≡ n, and this message trivially satisfies conditions 1–4 of the definition.
Also, the server’s reply to this message is determinable. Namely, consider the state{C1x}x∈A that {C0x}x∈A evolves into. The server’s knowledge base isC1srv = C0srv∪{ip∣⋅cli, ip∣⋅srv,E′shkey∣⋅(id∣su)∣pi},
and the server’s reply is
m = E′shkey∣⋅({age∣su,n∣⋅,Sk−∣srv({age∣su,n∣⋅})})∣pi .
Indeed, one can verify that
n = E′shkey∣pi⋅ ({col1∣db1 ,n∣⋅⋅,Sk−∣pisrv({col1∣db1 ,n∣⋅⋅})})
satisfies the conditions from the above definition. Namely, no determined items from
m have been replaced in n (condition 1); both occurrences of age∣pisu have been replaced
by the same item, and similarly for n∣pi⋅ (condition 2); and col1∣db1 ↔srv id∣pisu, i.e., the
message contains only associations known by srv (condition 3). Condition 4 holds
trivially because there are no two context items satisfying the given condition.
Trace validity is defined step-by-step from the validity of its message transmissions.
A message transmission consists of identifiers a,b of the communication parties and
communicated message m. For validity, we require determinability both of the mes-
sage, and of the communication identifiers. This way, we check that both the knowl-
edge required to send the message, and the knowledge of where to send the message to,
have been modelled. Formally, for a basic message transmission a→ b ∶m, this means
determinability by the sender of the context message {m,a,b}. For the other two types
of the form a↦ b ∶m modelling cryptographic protocols, both actors contribute infor-
mation: the initiator of the protocol should determine the sender and receiver addresses
a, b, and both parties contribute parts of m:
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t = Determinable by a Determinable by b
a→ b ∶m {a,b,m} ∅
a↦ b ∶ ZK(m1;m2;m3;{na,nb}) {a,b,m1,na} nb
a↦ b ∶ ICredm1m2(m3;{n j}7j=1) {a,b,pk(m2),m1,n1,n2,n3,n7} {pk(m2),m2,m3,n4,n5,n6}
Table 6: Determinability requirements for the different types of message transmissions
Definition 26. Let {Cx}x∈A be a state, and t a message transmission. Let t = a→ b ∶m
or a↦ b ∶m, and let a,b ∈A be the actors such that a↔ σ(a), b↔ σ(b). We say that
t is valid in {Cx}x∈A if the messages indicated in Table 6 are determinable by a and b,
respectively. Trace t1;⋯;tk is valid in state {C0x}x∈A if, in the evolution
{C0x}x∈A t1→ {C1x}x∈A t2→⋯ tn→ {Cnx}x∈A,
each message transmission ti is valid in respective state {Ci−1x }x∈A.
For ZK proofs, the prover needs to know the private information for the proof, and
both parties contribute randomness. Note that to participate in the protocol, the verifier
does not need to know the public information or the properties to be proven; however,
he does need to know this information to be able to interpret the proof (i.e., to apply
the testing rule). For credential issuing, the user needs to know her secret identifier m1,
randomness, and the issuer’s public key; the issuer needs to know his private/public
key pair, the attributes to be signed, and additional randomness.
The following example highlights validity of message transmissions and traces.
Example 27. Consider the trace given in Example 22. In Example 25, we showed
determinability of the two messages transmitted in the trace; this argument can be eas-
ily extended to conclude determinability of the messages {a,b,m} from Definition 26,
and hence validity of the two message transmissions. We conclude that the trace is
valid.
Trace validity is implemented in the tool supporting our framework. We briefly
discuss the implementation. The main task in implementing trace validity is to check
for determinability of a message m; that is, to find a derivable message n that is equiv-
alent to m and satisfies properties (1) to (4) from Definition 24. Properties (1) and (2)
place restrictions on the form of the message, which can be expressed in terms of free
variables in a Prolog query to the deductive system. For properties (3) and (4) we check
associability as in Section 3.3.
B Inference Rules for Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Cre-
dential Issuing
In this appendix, we show how our models of ZK proofs and the credential issuing
protocol are derived.
B.1 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
ZK proofs allow a prover to prove to a verifier that he knows some secret information
satisfying certain properties with respect to some public information, without revealing
any information about the secret. For instance, consider a large group of prime order n
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Prover(x = logg h) Verifier(h)
u ∈R Zn
a← gu a //
c ∈R Zncoo
r← u+cx r //
gr ?= ahc
(a) Schnorr proof of knowledge
p↦ v ∶ ZK(k−;pk(k−);∅;{np,nv})
(where k− = x, pk(k−) = h, np = u, nv = c)
(b) Formal model of Schnorr proof
Figure 19: Schnorr proof of knowledge and its formal model
generated by a group element g. Note that given value h, it is infeasible to determine
the discrete logarithm x = logg h; this property can be exploited to build a public key
cryptosystem in which values of h are public keys, and the corresponding values of x
are private keys. A prover who knows x as well as n, g, and h can engage in a ZK proof
protocol with a verifier who just knows n, g, and h; when the protocol has finished
successfully, the verifier is convinced that the prover knows the value of x, without
learning anything about its value.
The general definition of ZK proofs leaves open different kinds of implementations;
we model a particular kind of ZK proof called Σ-protocols [41]. Σ-protocols are three-
move protocols in which the prover first sends a commitment; the verifier responds
with a randomly generated challenge; and finally the prover sends a response. The ZK
proofs used in the systems analysed [8, 24, 25, 51] are of this kind.
An example Σ-protocol is the protocol proposed by Schnorr to prove knowledge
of x = logg h in the setting given above (Figure 19(a)). The prover computes a random
u and sends a commitment gu to the verifier. The verifier responds with a random
challenge c. The prover calculates response r = u+ cx. The verifier convinces himself
that the prover indeed knows the secret x by checking that gr = ahc using the response,
commitment and public information. The prover can only calculate a valid response if
he knows the secret; also, the response does not reveal any information about x [85].
We formally model ZK proofs at a high level using the primitive ZK(m1;m2;m3;n).
The secret information m1 and public information m2 are described in terms of mes-
sages; the ZK proof proves that the public information has a certain message structure
with respect to the secret information. In addition, the proof can show that context
data items d occurring in m1 satisfy properties ψk(d), listed in m3. Finally, n repre-
sents randomness; in Σ-protocols, n = {np,nv}, representing the provers’ randomness
np for the commitment and the verifier’s randomness nv for the challenge. For instance,
ZK(k−;pk(k−);∅;{np,nv}) is a proof of knowledge of the private key k− correspond-
ing to public key pk(k−) with no properties and contributed randomness np,nv. From
this high-level description in terms of structure of messages, the low-level description
follows implicitly. For instance, in a setting where public/private key pairs are of the
form (h,x = logg h), the proof ZK(k−;pk(k−); ∅;{np,nv}) corresponds to a proof of
knowledge of the discrete logarithm x = logg h of h like the Schnorr protocol. Figure 19
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Ca ⊢ ZK(m1;m2;m3;{np,nv})
(⊢EZ1’)Ca ⊢m3
Ca ⊢ ZK(m1;m2;m3;{np,nv})
(⊢EZ2’)Ca ⊢ nvCa ⊢ ZK(m1;m2;m3;{np,nv})
(⊢EZ3’)Ca ⊢m2Ca ⊢ ZK(m1;m2;m3;{np,nv}) Ca ⊢ np
(⊢EZ4’)Ca ⊢m1Ca ⊢ ZK(m1;m2;m3;{np,nv}) Ca ⊢m1
(⊢EZ5’)Ca ⊢ npCa ⊢ ZK(m1;m2;m3;{np,nv}) Ca ⊢ n′p (n′p ≐ np) (⊢TZ1’)Ca ⊢ npCa ⊢ {m1,...,m j,n1,...,nk,p1,...,pl ,np,nv}
(⊢CZ’)Ca ⊢ ZK({m1,...,m j};{n1,...,nk};{p1, ...pl};{np;nv})
Figure 20: Complete set of inference and rules for ZK (Ca a set of context messages;
m∗, n∗ context messages; pi properties of mk, i.e., every pi =ψ j(mk) ∈Dc for some j,
k) )
shows the Schnorr protocol and its formal model in this setting.
In Figure 20, we present a set of inference rules for the ZK primitive. We first
explain them, and then argue that for privacy purposes and under certain assumptions,
it suffices to consider the smaller set of rules presented in Figure 4. We first discuss
what messages can be derived from a ZK transcript ZK(m1;m2;m3;{np,nv}) using
elimination and testing rules. The property proven by a ZK proof determines the format
of the messages in the ZK proof protocol. Hence, we allow any actor to derive the
properties m3 from the transcript (⊢EZ1’). (Because different properties may have
identically-looking ZK proof protocols, this is an over-approximation of knowledge.)
The verifier randomness nv is transmitted as challenge, and so can be derived from the
transcript (⊢EZ2’). Because both parties are assumed to know m2 before the start of a
ZK proof, it does not need to follow from the transcript. However, depending on the
protocol, it may be possible to derive m2. E.g., in the Schnorr example, h = (gra−1)−c.
Hence, as a possible over-approximation, we allow any observer to derive the public
information m2 (⊢EZ3’).
The fact that the protocol is zero-knowledge means that a verifier (who knows m2,
m3 and nv) should not be able to learn anything about m1. In fact, if there are sev-
eral possible secrets m1 corresponding to public information m2, then the probability
distribution for protocol transcripts is required to be independent from m1. Thus, it
is impossible to test m1 from the transcript. (Of course, if m2 determines m1, e.g., if
they are a public/private key pair, then m1 can be derived using m2, but this is not due
to the ZK proof.) Because the verifier, who knows all components of the ZK proof
except m1 and np, cannot deduce anything about the secret m1, any inference rule to
derive it needs to have np as a prerequisite. By a similar line of reasoning, if m1 can
be derived from np, then an inference rule for np needs m1, or it needs to be a testing
rule. In fact, in the Schnorr proof, in Σ-protocols all these inferences can be made: m1
can be derived directly from np (⊢EZ4’) and vice versa (⊢EZ5’), and np can be tested
(⊢TZ2’).
To generate a transcript ZK(m1;m2;m3;{np,nv}) of a Σ-protocol, an actor needs
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Ca ⊢ pk(k−) Ca ⊢m1 Ca ⊢ na
(⊢CS0)Ca ⊢ S0k−(m1,na)
Ca ⊢ S0k−(m1,na) Ca ⊢ {k−,m2,nb}
(⊢CS0’)Ca ⊢ Sk−(m1,m2,na,nb)
Figure 21: Inference rules for signature scheme with signatures on committed values
(Ca a set of context messages; k−, m∗, n∗ context messages)
np for the commitment; nv for the challenge; and both pieces of randomness and
the private information for the response np (⊢CZ’). (Technically, the public infor-
mation is not needed.) Similarly, for determinability of the message transmission
a↦ b ∶ ZK(m1;m2;m3; {np,nv}), the prover needs {m1,np} in addition to the com-
munication addresses {a,b}; the verifier needs nv.
There are two aspects the above model does not take into account. First, from two
ZK proofs using the same prover randomness, the secret can be derived: in case of the
Schnorr proof, by computing (r− r′)/(c− c′) from transcripts (a,c,r) and (a,c′,r′).
This is a general property of Σ-protocols called special soundness. However, if the
prover always honestly generates his randomness, then this is very unlikely and we
can safely ignore it. Second, an actor can also “simulate” a ZK proof transcript without
knowing the secret information by first generating the challenge and response and from
that determining the commitment. Such a simulation has the exact same form as a ZK
proof, but because the randomness in the commitment is unknown, it cannot be used
to derive a secret corresponding to the public information. Such simulations are very
unlikely to correspond to ZK proofs that really took place, so they are not relevant for
knowledge analysis.
To express privacy requirements, the knowledge of randomness is not directly rel-
evant. In addition, assuming that the randomness of the ZK proof is freshly generated
and not reused elsewhere, it is clear that it cannot help to derive information indirectly:
(⊢EZ4’) is the only rule to derive personal information (namely, m1) using random-
ness, and it has knowledge of np as prerequisite, which can only be derived when m1 is
already known. Ignoring rules (⊢EZ2’), (⊢EZ5’), we obtain the inference rules given
in Figure 4, and determinability requirements in Table 6.
B.2 Anonymous Credentials and Issuing
In an anonymous credential system, credentials credM1
k− (M2;M3) assert the link between
a user’s identifier M1 and her attributes M2 using secret key k−, and such credentials
are issued and shown anonymously [24]. Anonymous issuing means the issuer of the
credential does not learn the user’s identifier M1 (in particular, this means he cannot
issue credentials containing the identifier without the user’s involvement). We model
the issuing protocol by the ICredM1
k− (M2;M′3) primitive. The randomness M′3 used in the
issuing protocol determines the randomness M3 in the credential. Anonymous showing
means that it is possible to perform ZK proofs of ownership of a credential proving
certain properties. This is captured by our ZK primitive.
We model anonymous credential systems constructed from signature schemes [24,
25] as used in the Identity Mixer system [8]. In general, this construction is possible
if the signature scheme allows for issuing of signatures on committed values (Fig-
ure 21). That is, a commitment S0k−(m1,na) to message m1 using randomness na is
constructed using public key pk(k−) (⊢CS0); this commitment is turned into signature
Sk−(m1,m2,na,nb) using private key k−, message m2 and randomness nb, (⊢CS0’).
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a→ b ∶ S0k−(m1,n2);
a↦ b ∶ ZK(m1,n1,n2;pk(k−),H(m1,n1),S0k−(m1,n2);∅;{n3,n4});
b→ a ∶ {Sk−(m1,m2,n2,n5),n5};
b↦ a ∶ ZK(k−;pk(k−),S0k−(m1,n2),m2,n5,
Sk−(m1,m2,n2,n5);∅;{n6,n7})
Credential obtained: {Sk−(m1,m2,n2,n5),n2,n5}
(a) Issuing protocol for anonymous credentials
a↦ b ∶ ICredm1k− (m2;{ni}7i=1)
Credential obtained: credm1k− (m2;{n2,n5})
(b) Formal model of anonymous credential issuing protocol
Figure 22: Anonymous credentials from signature scheme with signatures on commit-
ted values
Based on such a scheme, an anonymous credential credm1
k− (m2;{na,nb}) is simply a
randomised signature (containing secret identifier m1 and attributes m2) along with its
used randomness. In the Identity Mixer system, two such signature schemes can be
used: SRSA-CL signatures [24] and BM-CL signatures [25]. There are slight technical
differences between the two; we discuss SRSA-CL signatures and briefly outline the
differences later.
The anonymous credential issuing protocol can be modelled as a trace in terms of
the signature scheme (Figure 22(a)). It involves a user a and an issuer b. As before, a is
assumed to have sent a commitmentH(m1,n1) to her secret identifier to b prior to ini-
tiating the protocol. (Unlike the commitment S0k−(m1,n2) for the signature,H(m1,n1)
does not depend on k− and can thus be shared with other issuing or showing protocols
for credentials having a different key.) In the first two messages, actor a provides her
commitment for the signature, and then proves that it is formed correctly; that is, it
indeed contains the identifier corresponding to the one in H(m1,n1). Actor b uses the
commitment to construct a signature on {m1,m2,n2,n5}, and sends the signature along
with his randomness to a. At this point, a knows the signature and the two pieces of
randomness used in it: these three components together form the anonymous creden-
tial, as shown in the figure. (Note that b does not know n2, so he does not have the
complete credential.) In the last step, the signer b proves that Sk−(m1,m2,n2,n5) is
valid; when using the SRSA-CL signature scheme, this step is technically needed to
ensure the security of the signature [8]. Figure 22(b) displays our high-level model of
the issuing protocol and the credential obtained from it.
The high-level inference rules (Figure 4) and determinability relation (Table 6) for
cred and ICred follow from the lower-level model in Figure 22(a). The credential’s
signature can be verified using messages {pk(k−),m1,m2}, and a credential can be
constructed from its components (⊢CR). Although randomness can be inferred from
the credential, we do not model these inferences in the high-level model because they
are not relevant for knowledge of personal information.
From the issuing protocol, the user can infer the credential using the randomness
from the credential (⊢EI1). We check the messages of the trace for further possible in-
ferences. For the two ZK proofs, (⊢EZ1) does not apply because there are no proofs of
properties. The (⊢EZ2) rule can be applied to both ZK proofs occurring in the issuing
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protocol; this translates to rules (⊢EI2) and (⊢EI3). We also consider the derivation of
the nonces n1, n2 (⊢EI2): n1 is generated outside of the issuing protocol, so its deriva-
tion may be of interest; n2 is a prerequisite for (⊢EZ2). Rule (⊢EZ3) gives (⊢EI4). We
do not add a rule to derive S0k−(m1,n2) from the transcript because its knowledge is not
relevant from a privacy point of view. Also, this message does not allow the deriva-
tion of any information that was not already derivable from the zero-knowledge proofs.
However, it does give testing rule (⊢TI2). Testing rule rules (⊢TI1) and (⊢TI3) follow
from the first message transmission. The other testing rules (⊢TI4), (⊢TI5) follow from
the corresponding testing rule (⊢TZ1) for zero-knowledge proofs.
Finally, consider ICredm1
k− (m2;{ni}7i=1)’s determinability requirements. Assuming
fresh nonces, determinability of {a,b,pk(k−),m1,n2} by a is required for the first
message transmission. For the first ZK proof, determinability by a of n1 and n3 is
required; and determinability by b of n4. The next message means determinabil-
ity of {k−,m2,n5} by b. The last ZK proof additionally means determinability of{pk(k−),n6} by b, and n7 by a. We get the determinability requirements given in
Table 6. Note that technically, a does not need m2 to run the protocol, and b does
not need H(m1,n1); however, in practice, they will check whether the data supplied
matches their expectations using the checks expressed by the testing rules.
We mention two modelling details regarding the use of SRSA-CL signatures for
anonymous credentials. First, the last ZK proof in the issuing trace is technically not
a proof of knowledge of the private key, but of the RSA inverse of part of the issuer’s
randomness. However, in terms of knowledge this proof is equivalent because the
private key can be determined from the RSA inverse and vice versa [18]. Second,
due to the structure of the signature, different choices for na and nb can lead to content
equivalent signatures. However, assuming na and nb are chosen at random, this happens
with negligible probability.
Finally, an alternative signature scheme supporting signatures on committed values
is the BM-CL scheme [25]. There are two technical differences with the SRSA-CL-
based system presented above. First, BM-CL signatures have the additional property
that they allow “blinding”: a user can turn a valid credential credm1
k− (m2;{na,nb}) into
a different credential credm1
k− (m2;{n′a,nb}) (however, she is not able to change random-
ness nb). Second, the final ZK proof in the issuing protocol of Figure 22 is not nec-
essary for a BM-CL-based scheme. We chose the SRSA-CL-based signature scheme
because the high-level model is simpler; however, in terms of privacy the choice of
signature scheme does not matter.
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Table 7: Schematic overview of the requirements in Table 4. Each row indicates
that with respect to the given coalition of actors, (a) the given items should be
(un)detectable; (b) the involvement of the given actors should be unknown; and (c)
Alice’s profiles in the given domains should be (un)associable
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